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PARITY LOST:  THE PRICE OF A
CORPORATE TAX IN A PROGRESSIVE
TAX WORLD
Richard Winchester*
ABSTRACT
The United States has always taxed income at progressive rates, so that an
individual’s tax burden would increase with his ability to pay.  Whenever the United
States has had an income tax, it has also imposed an entity level tax on the profits of
certain businesses, but not others.  Both the structure of the progressive tax rates and
the design of the entity level tax on business profits have evolved over time, resulting
in a wide range of incentives and outcomes.  This Article recounts the early history of
the income tax in the United States, focusing on how an entity level tax on business
profits operated within the context of a system that taxed individuals at progressive
rates.  It highlights how the combination of rules created disparities in the taxation of
business profits, setting the stage for individuals to exploit those disparities in an
effort to minimize their tax bills.  Although Congress adopted measures to reduce the
disparities and curb tax avoidance, such measures proved increasingly less effective
as the income tax took on a more progressive design, resulting in distorted outcomes
that seemed to get worse over time.  In light of this experience, the Article questions
whether the system ever achieved any form of parity in the taxation of business prof-
its, potentially undermining its very ability to operate in a progressive way.
INTRODUCTION
Scholars typically apply three criteria to evaluate a tax:  fairness, effi-
ciency and simplicity.1  Of these three, fairness may be considered the most
fundamental quality that a tax should possess because it reflects the universal
desire for equity and equal treatment.2  Indeed, the public has consistently dis-
played an expectation that equity should play a role in setting tax policy, even
if it is not the dominant role.3
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valuable research assistance on this project.  I also received helpful comments from Michael
Lang, Michael Yu, Karen Burke and Andre Cummings.  Earlier versions of this paper were
presented at workshops sponsored by the Southern California Junior Law Faculty and the
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Jefferson School of Law.
1 MICHAEL A LIVINGSTON, TAXATION:  LAW, PLANNING, AND POLICY, at xxxiv (2003).
2 C. Eugene Steuerle, And Equal (Tax) Justice for All?, in TAX JUSTICE:  THE ONGOING
DEBATE 253, 254-57 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry Jr. eds., 2002).
3 Id. at 255-57.
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When scholars ask whether a tax is fair or equitable, they generally focus
on the distribution of the tax burden.  There are several theories that can justify
a particular allocation of the tax burden.  However, the income tax in the
United States has always been intended to allocate the burden based on an
individual’s ability to pay.4  This essentially embraces a theory of fairness
referred to as the equal sacrifice theory.5  That doctrine acknowledges that
money has declining marginal utility, so that a rich person will value an addi-
tional dollar less than a poor person will.6  Accordingly, a rich person would
need to pay tax at a higher rate in order to equal the sacrifice made by a poor
person subject to a lower tax rate.7  This is the understanding that supports a tax
that imposes progressively higher rates on higher levels of income.8
However, a progressive system of rates will not necessarily cause the tax
burden to be allocated in a way that reflects an individual’s ability to pay.  For
example, any effort to allocate a greater share of the tax burden to higher
income individuals will be frustrated if individuals who occupy the same
income level do not pay the same amount in tax.9  In other words, the system
will not treat individuals at different income levels differently if it fails in the
first instance to treat individuals at the same income levels the same.
There are a number of factors that might prevent individuals from paying
the same tax even though they fall within the same income range.  For example,
consider a rule that exempts a certain item of income from tax, perhaps because
of a governmental policy to favor the activities that generate that kind of
income.  Now imagine two individuals who have identical amounts of income,
but the first derives all of his income from the exempt source while the second
derives all of his income from taxable sources.  In the absence of the rule, both
individuals would pay the same amount of tax.  However, the existence of the
rule causes the first individual to pay no tax while the second one remains
subject to tax.  The disparate outcomes produced by the absence of a uniform
rule may call into question how fair the tax system really is, because both indi-
viduals appear to have the same ability to pay the tax.
4 The first federal income tax, enacted in 1861, was designed with this goal in mind.  W.
Elliot Brownlee, Social Philosophy and Tax Regimes in the United States, 1763 to the Pre-
sent, in TAXATION, ECONOMIC PROSPERITY, AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 1, 10 (Ellen Frankel
Paul et al. eds., 2006).  A progressive income tax was expected to compensate for high tariffs
and excise taxes on a wide range of consumer goods. Id.
5 See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, PROGRESSIVE TAXATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 214 (2d
ed. 1908).  Alternatively, the burden could be allocated in line with the benefits one receives
from the government. STEPHEN F. WESTON, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN TAXATION 247
(1903).
6 SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 214. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF
OWNERSHIP:  TAXES AND JUSTICE 24 (2002).
7 SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 214-15.
8 This assumes ability to pay is measured by income.  One could also measure income on
some other basis, such as wealth.  Steuerle, supra note 2, at 270.  Alternatively, one could
theoretically tax individuals based on their ability to earn. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6,
at 22-23.
9 This observation essentially reflects the view expressed in the economics literature that
vertical equity cannot be achieved unless horizontal equity is first achieved. MURPHY &
NAGEL, supra note 6, at 13 (citing RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC
FINANCE 160 (1959)).
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The United States has never had a uniform way of taxing business profits.
In fact, every tax on income has included at least two different approaches for
taxing the profits of a business.  Today, the two principal approaches are
reflected in the way the tax law treats partnerships and corporations.  In the
case of a partnership, the firm itself is not subject to tax on its business profits.
Instead, the partners are required to pay tax on their share of the firm’s profits,
whether they receive any or not.10  This is often referred to as a flow through
model of taxation.  In the case of a corporation, the firm and its owners consti-
tute separate and distinct taxpaying units, with the firm subject to tax on any
profits it makes, and the owners separately subject to tax on any profits they
actually receive.11  Because both the firm and its owners are subject to tax on
corporate profits, the corporate model is often described as a double tax on
those profits.
Even though the tax law has always included more than one way for tax-
ing firm profits, lawmakers did not always intend for the methods to produce
inconsistent outcomes.  In fact, as this article will show, Congress seemed com-
mitted to preserving parity in the taxation of business profits at least until the
1930s.  However, some of its efforts were more successful than others.
The various approaches to taxing business profits during the nineteenth
century did not create significant disparities.12  However, the disparities
became more pronounced and more widespread in the twentieth century.13  The
disparities grew more pronounced over time in part because of the way the two
sets of rules for taxing business profits operated within the larger tax system.
The nineteenth century income tax system had a relatively simple design and
sometimes used a single tax rate to determine someone’s tax liability.  In addi-
tion, the tax on business profits operated as little more than a mechanism for
collecting the tax owed by the business owners on their share of business prof-
its.  However, the income tax of the twentieth century has always featured a
progressive rate structure, with higher rates of tax applying to higher levels of
income.  Indeed, when the country adopted the modern income tax as a perma-
nent part of its fiscal affairs, one of the central objectives was to impose a tax
based on an individual’s ability to pay.14  At the same time, the system
included a unique way for taxing the profits of a business when it was incorpo-
rated.  Corporate profits were not taxed in full if the firm did not distribute
them to its shareholders.  By contrast, any distributed corporate profits and any
profits of an unincorporated business, such as a partnership or sole proprietor-
ship, were taxed in full in all cases.
The partial tax relief available to undistributed corporate profits was based
on the view that the firm would later invest these amounts in the business.15
10 See I.R.C. § 701 (2006).  Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the “I.R.C.” are
references to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended (Title 26 of the United States
Code).
11 See I.R.C. § 11(a) (imposing a tax on the income of any corporation) and I.R.C.
§ 61(a)(7) (requiring any recipient of a dividend to include the item in “gross income”,
exposing it to tax).
12 See infra text accompanying notes 16-79.
13 See infra Tables 1 through 3 and Charts 1 through 3 in the Appendix.
14 H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at II (1913).
15 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 156 and 174.
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However, the disparity in the taxation of business profits set the stage for the
formation and use of corporations that withheld profits from shareholders
solely to avoid tax that would otherwise be assessed.  This Article recounts the
evolution of the income tax in the United States, with particular attention to the
taxation of business profits.  It focuses on how the growing disparities in the
taxation of business profits created increasingly irresistible incentives for tax
avoidance.  It also summarizes the efforts undertaken to curb such activity.
The historical account covers the period starting from the Civil War to the mid
1930s and is divided into two parts.  The first part covers the tax acts of the
nineteenth century when the systems for taxing incomes had a very modest
progressive design.  The second half covers the modern income tax that has
evolved to the one we have today.  The Article concludes with an analysis that
calls into question whether the failure to curb tax avoidance undermined the
efforts to tax income in a progressive way.
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY INCOME TAX ACTS
The United States has a long tradition of using taxation to restrict privi-
lege, a tradition that derives from republican values that competed with notions
of individual liberty since at least the days of the founding fathers.16  Until the
Civil War, the idea that privilege should be restricted was largely reflected in
state tax laws that were purposely designed to achieve a measure of social
justice.17  Thus, flat taxes were imposed on real and personal property on the
theory that people with high incomes spent a larger share of their incomes on
land and property than low income individuals did.18
Republican values did not immediately influence the structure of taxes at
the federal level because the Constitution required any direct federal tax to be
uniform.19  As a result, the federal government was financed solely with tariffs
and excise taxes until the Civil War.20  However, the Union government had to
find an alternative to taxes on consumption because simply raising them to
support an army was politically impossible.21  The solution was to adopt the
country’s first tax on income.22  It would be the first of four temporary mea-
sures to tax incomes.23  In each instance, the tax was structured to operate in a
progressive manner, with a low tax rate applying to low levels of income and
higher rates applying to higher levels of income.24  At the same time,
lawmakers observed two different procedures for taxing business profits.  The
first procedure was to require each owner of the firm to pay tax on his share of
16 Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Equity versus Efficiency and the U.S. Tax System in Historical
Perspective, in TAX JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 25, 28.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
20 Ventry, supra note 16, at 29.
21 Id.
22 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (repealed 1862).
23 Id. See also Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509; Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13
Stat. 223; Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 89-93, 12 Stat. 432.
24 See, e.g., infra notes 30-33, 50, 92-93 and accompanying text. R
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the profits of the enterprise.25  The second approach was to require the firm, not
its owners, to pay the tax on its profits.26  The government made a conscious
attempt to coordinate the tax paid by the firm with the larger progressive tax on
individuals so as to minimize any disparities in the way business profits were
taxed and to avoid any possibility that any dollar of profits would be taxed
twice.27  These efforts were rarely a perfect solution, but they were largely
successful at eliminating the most substantial disparities.
1861
The very first income tax was adopted in 1861.28  It was a 3% levy on
income in excess of $800.29  However, because the Treasury made no effort to
assess or collect any tax under this law, the 1861 Act was virtually meaning-
less.30  Thus, as a practical matter, all income was taxed at a zero rate.
1862
Congress enacted an income tax in 1862 in order to finance the Civil
War.31  Under the 1862 Act, all individuals were exempt on the first $600 of
income.32  An individual whose income did not exceed $10,000 was taxed at
3% on his entire income in excess of the $600 exemption.33  An individual
whose income exceeded $10,000 was taxed at 5% on his entire income in
excess of the $600 exemption.34  Thus, when the country first implemented a
progressive rate structure, it did so by requiring higher income individuals to
pay higher rates on their entire income.  This procedure stands in contrast to the
progressive marginal rate structure that would characterize all future tax acts.35
Under those later acts, a different rate would apply to different portions of an
individual’s income.36
The system adopted in 1862 was designed so that the profits of any busi-
ness would be subject to tax when paid out to its owners.37  Moreover, in most
25 This was the approach generally observed for firms other than financial institutions and
companies in the transportation sector. See, e.g., text accompanying note 38. R
26 Certain financial institutions and companies in the transportation sector were treated this
way. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 39-42. R
27 See text accompanying note 43. R
28 Act of Aug. 5, 1861, § 49, 12 Stat. at 309.
29 Id.
30 This was primarily because the legislation was largely viewed as a provisional measure
that was expected to be considerably revised at the next session of Congress. HAROLD Q.
LANGENDERFER, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1861-1872, at 236-37 (1954); EDWIN R. A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX:  A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF
INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 435 (1911).
31 JOHN F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 68
(1985).
32 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, § 90, 12 Stat. 432, 473.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223.
36 See, e.g., Id. § 116, 13 Stat. at 281, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469.
37 This stands in contrast to a rule that applies a tax to all the profits derived by a business,
whether paid out to the owners or not.  That model was expressly adopted in the Revenue
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cases, the firm’s owners, not the firm itself, were responsible for actually pay-
ing the tax.38  However, the recipient did not have to pay tax on any dividends
from certain companies that were required to withhold a tax on dividends paid
to shareholders.39  Specifically, certain financial institutions, including banks,
trust companies, savings institutions, and insurance companies had to pay a 3%
tax on any profits paid out as dividends.40  This tax had to be deducted from the
dividends actually paid out.41  In a similar fashion, all railroad companies had
to pay a 3% tax on any profits paid out as dividends, withholding the tax from
the dividend.42  The tax withheld from these payments was designed to be a
substitute for the tax that the recipient would have had to pay.  Lawmakers
intentionally structured the tax to operate in this way so as to avoid a double
tax.43
However, there was one disparity that arose out of the interaction of the
progressive tax on individuals and the flat tax that was withheld on dividends
paid by taxable businesses.  The income from a taxable business would be
overtaxed to a person whose total income was less than $600.  In such a situa-
tion, the 3% tax paid by the business on the owner’s share of the profits would
exceed the zero percent tax that would have applied had the dividend been paid
by a business not subject to the entity level tax.  Meanwhile, the income from
the business would be undertaxed to a person whose total income was over
$10,000.  In such a situation, the 3% tax paid by the business on the owner’s
share of the profits would be less than the 5% tax that would have applied had
the individual been required to pay the tax on that income.
The possibility that profits of the business could be overtaxed was not
without controversy.44  However, as a practical matter, that possibility probably
did not represent a major problem.  An individual whose income fell below the
$600 exemption likely received little to no dividends.  This scenario is sup-
ported by the fact that the tax on dividends accounted for a very small share of
total income tax revenues.45
Act of 1864, which is discussed in the 1864-1872 section of this Article. See infra pp. 136-
139.  The Revenue Act of 1862 does not expressly limit the tax to profits that are paid out.
Instead, it is a result of the way the Act defined an individual’s taxable income.  It included
all “profits,” “dividends” and income “from any other source whatever.”  Act of July 1,
1862, § 90, 12 Stat. at 473.  It would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to conclude
that certain undistributed profits should be taxed.  Moreover, it may be that this issue has
little practical significance.  At the time the law was in effect, it was the general practice for
a business to distribute all of its earnings to its owners.  Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In
Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 915 (2006) (citing WILLIAM Z.
RIPLEY, RAILROADS:  FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 244 (1915)).
38 Act of July 1, 1862, § 90, 12 Stat. at 473.
39 Id. § 91, 12 Stat. at 473-74.
40 Id. §§ 81-82, 12 Stat. at 469-71.
41 Id.
42 Id.  Railroads had to deduct and withhold a similar 3% tax on interest paid to bondhold-
ers. Id.
43 Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43
WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 453-54 (2001).
44 LANGENDERFER, supra note 30, at 507-09.
45 ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER:  ORIGINS OF THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913, at 279 n.74 (1993).
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By contrast, the possibility that profits of a business could be undertaxed
was viewed with enough concern that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
issued a regulation to address the inequity.46  Under that rule, a 2% tax would
be owed on dividends and interest received by individuals whose income
exceeded $10,000.47  That tax, combined with the 3% tax paid by the business,
would equal the 5% tax that would have applied if the statute required the
individual to be taxed on his share of the profits of the business.
Thus, the income tax system and the entity level tax on certain businesses
were coordinated in a way to eliminate major disparities in the amount of tax
assessed on an individual’s share of the profits of a business.  However, these
efforts did not eliminate all of the disparities.  While there is reason to believe
that these disparities did not have much practical significance at the time, they
foreshadow the kinds of issues that would be faced in the future as both the tax
system and the national economy underwent changes.
1864 – 1872
By 1864, the country needed more money and restructured the income tax
to alleviate its financial condition.48  The new measure enacted by Congress
differed from the 1862 Act in three important ways.49  First, the tax rates them-
selves were increased.  Second, the schedule of tax rates applied in bracketed
fashion so that each rate applied only to income that fell within a certain range,
not to an individual’s entire income.  Third, the profits of a business were
expressly taxed to the owners, not to the business.
Under the 1864 Act, an individual was exempt on his first $600 of income,
a 5% tax applied to income over $600 and up to $5,000, while a 10% tax
applied to all income over $10,000.50  One early tax scholar noted that the
progressive design of the 1864 Act was the subject of some discussion, imply-
ing that it was not without controversy:
Secretary [of the Treasury] Fessenden, in his report for 1864, defended the pro-
gressive income tax in the following words:  “The adoption of a scale augmenting the
rate of taxation upon incomes as they rise in amount, although unequal in one sense,
cannot be considered oppressive or unjust, inasmuch as the ability to pay increases in
much more than arithmetical proportion as the amount of income exceeds the limit of
reasonable necessity.”51
46 GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 197 (1863).
47 Id.
48 Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 423 (1894).
49 Compare Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, with Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119,
12 Stat. 432.
50 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469 (amending Act of June 30, 1864, § 116, 13 Stat.
at 281).  Prior to the amendment, an individual was exempt on his first $600 of income, a 5%
tax applied on income over $600 and up to $5,000, a 7.5% tax applied on income over
$5,000 and up to $10,000, and a 10% tax applied on income over $10,000.  Act of June 30,
1864, § 116, 13 Stat. at 281.  Congress made the change in order to reduce a shortfall in
expected revenues. STANLEY, supra note 45, at 35.
51 SELIGMAN, supra note 5, at 102 (quoting REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
15 (1864)).
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The profits of a business were expressly taxed to the individual owners,
regardless of whether the business was incorporated and regardless of whether
the profits were paid out to the owners.52  Thus, as in the Act of 1862, the Act
of 1864 contained a uniform rule for taxing the profits of a business.  The two
Acts differed, however, in that the former limited the tax to profits paid out to
owners, while the latter applied the tax to profits that were paid out as well as
profits that were retained by the business.
Superficially, the 1864 Act eliminated any possibility that an individual’s
share of business profits would either be overtaxed or undertaxed, as was the
case under the 1862 Act.  However, a number of other provisions had the effect
of perpetuating the same problem as existed under the prior law.
Under the 1864 Act, a business that operated in certain industries had to
pay a flat tax on its annual profits.53  Certain financial institutions had to pay a
5% tax on all dividends paid to shareholders and on any undistributed sur-
plus.54  A separate provision required certain transportation companies to pay a
5% tax on all dividends paid to shareholders and any undistributed surplus.55
In each case, the tax on the dividends had to be withheld from the payments
made to the shareholders, just as they had under the 1862 Act.
The design of the tax raised the possibility that the profits from these taxa-
ble businesses could be double taxed in two different ways.  First, a double tax
on the same dollar profits would arise if a dividend was paid out of previously
taxed undistributed profits from a prior year.  This problem was addressed by
relieving the company from the obligation to withhold tax on any such divi-
dend.56  Double taxation would also arise if the recipient of a dividend would
have to pay tax on that item of income.  This problem was addressed in the
same way as it was in the 1862 Act.  Thus, any dividends received from such
taxable businesses did not have to be taken into account by the recipient.57  Of
course, this solution was an imperfect one for the same reasons as the 1862 Act,
in that it did not completely eliminate the disparities in the taxation of business
52 Act of June 30, 1864, § 117, 13 Stat. at 282 (“[T]he gains and profits of all companies,
whether incorporated or partnership .  .  .  shall be included in estimating the annual gains,
profits, or income of any person entitled to the same, whether divided or otherwise.”).
Under the interpretation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the amounts taxed to an
individual included the undivided profits of a corporation. See DIGEST OF DECISIONS AND
REGULATIONS MADE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 1864-1898, at 16, 36,
37, 39, 40 (1906).  In dictum, the Supreme Court concurred with this interpretation in Col-
lector v. Hubbard.  Collector v. Hubbard, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 1 (1870).  Taxing partnerships
and corporations in the same way under a uniform rule seems to be consistent with the
prevailing view about the nature of a partnership and a corporation.  At the time, both busi-
ness forms were considered to be an aggregate of its owners. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser,
Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53, 58
(1990 ).
53 Act of June 30, 1864, §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. at 283-85.
54 Id. § 120, 13 Stat. at 283-84.  A business was subject to this provision if it was a “bank,
trust company, savings institution, and of any fire, marine, life, [or] inland insurance com-
pany . . . .” Id.
55 Id. § 122, 13 Stat. at 284-85.  The same withholding tax applied to any interest paid to
bondholders. Id.  A business was subject to this provision if it was a railroad, canal, turn-
pike, canal navigation or slackwater company. Id.
56 Id. § 121, 13 Stat. at 284.
57 Id. § 117, 13 Stat. at 281.
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profits.  Admittedly, it was effective in preventing such business profits from
being double taxed in those situations in which the shareholder’s income fell
between $600 and $5,000, the range that was subject to a tax of 5%, the same
rate that applied to the business.  However, it did not alleviate the problem of
overtaxed or undertaxed profits that would occur when the shareholder’s
income fell outside of that range.  Because the 5% tax on the business was
more than the zero rate of tax on income up to $600, an individual in that
income bracket would be overtaxed on their share of the profits from such a
business.  Meanwhile, because the 5% tax on the business was lower than the
10% tax on individual income over $5,000, an individual in that income tax
bracket would be undertaxed on their share of the profits from such a
business.58
The problem of overtaxed and undertaxed business profits was corrected
under amendments incorporated into the 1864 Act before it went into effect.59
Under the amended version, an individual would have to include in income any
interest and dividends on which the payor had withheld tax.60  However, the
tax withheld on any payment was counted towards the recipient’s tax liabil-
ity.61  This tax credit mechanism stands in contrast to the provisions of the
original Act, which simply excluded these items of tax paid income from the
recipient’s gross income.62  Under the revised design, the potential for an item
to be undertaxed was eliminated because if the recipient had income in excess
of $10,000, placing him in the 10% tax bracket, a tax of 5% would still be
owed on any dividend on which the payor withheld 5%.
In 1867, Congress amended the 1864 Act so as to restructure the income
tax in other notable ways.63  Starting in 1867, the two-tiered graduated rates
were replaced with a flat 5% tax on all income in excess of a $1,000 exemption
amount.64  The change reduced the amount of progressivity built into the tax
system, but it did not eliminate it entirely because for all practical purposes,
there were two tax brackets:  a zero percent bracket and a five percent bracket.
Even this structure would cause an individual’s tax burden to gradually
increase with his ability to pay because the effective tax rate would rise with
the person’s income level.
The other notable amendment changed the way the tax on individuals was
coordinated with the entity level tax imposed on certain businesses.  The
existing law required an individual to take the dividends into account but per-
58 The possibility of overtaxed and undertaxed income did not exist under the bill that was
originally introduced by the House Ways and Means Committee.  That piece of legislation
imposed a flat 5% tax on all income, including business profits. SELIGMAN, supra note 30,
at 440.  The problem only arose after the bill was modified during Congressional debates to
include a graduated rate structure. Id. at 441.
59 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469 (amending Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13
Stat. 223).
60 Id., 13 Stat. at 479.
61 Id.
62 Act of June 30, 1864, § 117, 13 Stat. at 281.
63 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 471, 477-80 (amending Act of June 30, 1864,
ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223).
64 Id., 14 Stat. at 477-78.
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mitted the tax liability to be reduced by the tax withheld by the business.65
Starting in 1867, any dividends received from a taxable business would not be
taken into account when computing an individual’s tax liability.66  At a superfi-
cial level, this change did not create any disparities because the 5% flat tax
withheld from the payment was identical to the 5% flat tax imposed on the
individual.  However, because an individual was exempt on the first $1,000 of
income, there was at least the potential for a dividend to be overtaxed to the
extent it was paid to someone whose income did not exceed $1,000.  Congress
reduced the tax rate to 2.5% in 1870.67  The tax remained in effect and applied
to amounts earned through 1871. .68  It was never renewed and was simply
allowed to expire following multiple attempts by wealthy individual to repeal it
outright on the grounds that it was a temporary measure intended to meet the
demands of the war and nothing more.69
1894
Congress reinstituted an income tax in 1894 in the aftermath of the eco-
nomic dislocations produced by the Panic of 1893 and amid the growing sense
that the existing system of tariffs was an inequitable way to finance the govern-
ment.70  The measure was later invalidated by the Supreme Court and never
took effect.71  However, its provisions are instructive, in that they follow the
model set by prior Acts.  Some features were similar to those contained in the
1864 Act.72  Thus, there was a flat tax that applied to an individual’s income in
excess of an exempt amount.  In this case the tax was 2% and the exemption
was $4,000.73  The 1894 Act imposed the tax on an individual’s “profits, and
income .  .  . of every business, trade, or profession . . . .”74  This language does
not expressly state whether the tax was intended to reach an individual’s entire
share of business profits, whether paid out to the owner or not.  However, con-
cluding that it does would be reasonable.  First, the conclusion would be con-
sistent with the practice and policy initiated in the 1862 Act.  Second, it would
be consistent with the method of taxing business profits under the 1894 Act’s
rules that applied to certain taxable entities.
The 1894 Act revived the old entity level tax and extended its scope so
that it applied to all “corporations, companies, or associations doing business
for profit . . . .”75  Each such taxable entity had to pay a 2% tax on its “net
65 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
66 Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 13, 14 Stat. at 478.
67 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255, § 6, 16 Stat. 256, 257.
68 Id.  However, the tax was last collected in 1872 on amounts earned in 1871. See Act of
March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat, 478.
69 Ventry, supra note 16, at 29; Seligman, supra note 30 at 466-68. R
70 WITTE, supra note 31, at 70.
71 See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895).
72 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 223, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13
Stat. 469, further amended by Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 13, 14 Stat. 417, 477-80.
73 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, § 27, 28 Stat. 509, 553, invalidated by Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
74 Id.
75 Id. § 32, 28 Stat. at 556.
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profits,” whether paid out as a dividend or not.76  As under the amended Act of
1864, all of a corporation’s profits were to be taxed.77  However, unlike the
earlier Act, this one did not operate through the use of a withholding mecha-
nism on dividends.  Thus, amounts paid to shareholders represented the after-
tax profits of the corporation, not the pre-tax profits of the corporation reduced
to reflect the recipient’s tax on that income.  Nevertheless, as a result of the
coordination of the corporate tax and the individual tax, the tax paid by the
corporation on its profits took the place of the tax that would otherwise be paid
by the shareholder on any dividend.  This change is apparent from the fact that
their recipients did not take corporate dividends into account, eliminating the
possibility that such income would incur a double tax.78  Of course, this mecha-
nism for preventing a double tax did not prevent the possibility that an individ-
ual with less than $4,000 in income would be overtaxed on any corporate
dividend he received.  The number of cases that fell into this category remains
unknown.  On the one hand, the $4,000 exemption was expected to leave no
more than one-tenth of the population subject to the income tax.79  A tax-paid
corporate dividend could have been received by a substantial number of indi-
viduals with incomes below the $4,000 threshold.
SUMMARY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TAX ACTS – PARITY PRESERVED
There are four themes that run through the income tax acts of the late
nineteenth century.  First, each one contained a very modest progressive design,
in that some portion of income was exempt from tax even though a flat rate
might have been imposed on all income in excess of the exemption.  Second,
there was a concerted attempt to tax business profits in a uniform way.  In
1862, the uniform rule was to impose a tax on all profits paid out to the owners
of a business.  In 1864 and 1894, the uniform rule was to impose a tax on all
profits derived by the business, whether paid out or not.  Third, the government
made concerted efforts to prevent business profits from being undertaxed.  In
the 1862 Act, this was accomplished by an administrative practice to impose a
2% make-up tax on all dividends received by an individual in the 5% tax
bracket to supplement the 3% tax that was withheld.  In 1864, this was accom-
plished by giving the recipient of a dividend a credit for any tax withheld by the
company.  Fourth, in no instance was there an effort made to mitigate against
the risk of an overtaxed dividend, a possible reflection of the fact that any such
cases would be rare.
76 Id.  The Act provided that:
The net profits or income of all corporations, companies, or associations shall include the
amounts paid to shareholders, or carried to the account of any fund, or used for construction,
enlargement of plant, or any other expenditure or investment paid from the net annual profits
made or acquired by said corporations, companies, or associations.
Id.
77 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, §§ 120, 122, 13 Stat. 223, 283-85.
78 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, § 28, 28 Stat. at 554.
79 STANLEY, supra note 45 at 133 tbl.3-7.
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THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
The income tax laws that were enacted in the years following the adoption
of the Sixteenth Amendment continued the tradition of being structured in a
progressive way.  They also continued the tradition of treating certain busi-
nesses–specifically corporations–as separate taxpaying units.  However, the
income taxes of the twentieth century are distinctive in that the rate tables are
much more progressive, a feature that will exacerbate the potential for corpo-
rate profits to be either overtaxed or undertaxed.  Aware of these disparities and
the opportunities they created for taxpayers to avoid tax, lawmakers adopted
measures directed at restoring at least a measure of parity.  However, the early
measures proved ineffective, leading to a series of adjustments designed to
repair the shortcomings in the law.  However, these efforts to curb taxpayer
attempts to avoid tax proved to be largely futile, casting doubt on whether all
taxpayers in the same income level were actually paying the same amount of
tax.
1913
In the wake of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress adopted an income tax
on individuals and corporations.80  One of the overriding objectives of the Rev-
enue Act of 1913 was to devise a system that allowed the tax burden to vary
with an individual’s ability to pay.81  This objective was largely motivated by
the fact that the existing system of tariffs and excise taxes allocated the tax
burden in an inequitable way, with poorer persons having to surrender a greater
share of their income to the government than wealthy persons would.82
The tax system adopted in 1913 was slightly more complex than the ones
that preceded it, primarily because it actually consisted of two separate taxes on
individuals.83  The first was the normal tax and the second was the surtax.84
The 1913 Act also contained an entity level tax on corporations and similar
business forms.85  However, that tax did not interact with the normal tax in the
same way that it interacted with the surtax, creating disparities that lawmakers
struggled to address.86
The normal tax was a 1% tax on an individual’s net income in excess of an
exempt amount.87  The exempt amount depended on a person’s marital status.
An unmarried individual was allowed to exclude the first $3,000 from the nor-
80 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
81 H.R. REP. NO. 63-5, at 37 (1913).
82 Id.
83 Revenue Act of 1913 § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166.
84 Id.
85 The corporate tax applied to “[e]very corporation, joint-stock company or association,
and every insurance company, organized in the United States, no matter how created or
organized, not including partnerships . . . .” Id. § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. at 172.
86 It is not entirely clear why Congress adopted the system that it did.  The corporate income
tax replaced a virtually identical tax adopted in 1909.  The normal tax seems to have been
viewed as an extension of that tax to individuals. See 50 CONG. REC. 1302 (1913) (remarks
of Rep. Anderson).  Lawmakers may have viewed the surtax as the vehicle for achieving its
progressive objectives.
87 Revenue Act of 1913 § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166.
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mal tax, while married couples were collectively allowed to exclude the first
$4,000.88  An individual’s net income would include his share of the profits of
any partnership, whether those profits were distributed or not.89  However, net
income did not include any corporate dividends.90  Instead, all dividends and
any undistributed corporate profits were subject to an identical 1% tax at the
entity level under the corporate tax provisions.91  Thus as in prior tax laws, the
entity level tax paid by certain businesses was the functional substitute for the
tax that would have been paid by the recipient of any dividend.  However,
because the normal tax only kicked in when an individual’s income exceeded
the exempt amount, an individual whose income fell below that threshold
would have been overtaxed on his share of any corporate profits.
The disparities produced by the normal tax paled in comparison to the
disparities produced by the surtax.  Under the surtax, an individual whose
income exceeded $20,000 was subject to tax under a schedule of six rates rang-
ing from 1% to 6%.92  The rates applied in a graduated way with the 1% tax
applying to net income above $20,000 and up to $50,000, while the 6% rate
applied to amounts in excess $500,000.93  The members of Congress broadly
agreed on this overall structure of the surtax.94  However, lawmakers seemed to
struggle before settling on an approach for applying the surtax (or any second
level of tax) to business profits.
The application of the surtax to business profits was not expressly
addressed in the original bill reported out of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and later passed by the full House.95  The Senate Finance Committee
addressed the issue directly by amending the bill to include a provision that
required an individual to pay surtax on his share of the profits of any business,
whether incorporated or not, as long as he would be “legally entitled to enforce
the distribution or division of the same.”96  The drafters inserted this language
out of an apparent concern that both partnerships and corporations would start
reducing the amount of profits they distributed to their owners in an attempt to
prevent those profits from being subject to the surtax.97
88 Id. § II(C), 38 Stat. at 168.
89 Id. § II(D), 38 Stat. at 169.
90 Id. § II(B), 38 Stat. at 167.
91 Id. § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. at 172.
92 Id. § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166.
93 Id.
94 The Senate Finance Committee did not recommend any changes to this aspect of the tax
as proposed by the House Ways and Means Committee and adopted by the full House of
Representatives. Compare S. REP. NO. 63-80 (1913), with H.R. REP. NO. 63-5 (1913).
95 See H.R. REP. NO. 63-5 (1913). See also J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS:  1938-1861, at 983-84 (1938).
96 SEIDMAN, supra note 95, at 983.
97 Senator Williams offered this explanation in response to a question raised by Senator
Root on the floor of the Senate:
That language, “if divided or distributed,” is somewhat awkward, and for that very reason
we want it to go back to the committee; but the object of the amendment was this:  Here is a
partnership, for example; the partners might make a very large amount of money, but they can
effect an agreement whereby, instead of setting aside to each partner his income for that year,
they allow it to go into the business, each partner to draw against the firm and make a showing of
having no income at all from the partnership.  Then, it was thought that for the purpose of
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The idea of taxing an individual on a portion of firm profits not actually
received by him was not new.  The 1864 Act set a precedent for that.98  How-
ever, now lawmakers began to question whether the law could validly permit
the undistributed profits of a corporation to be considered the income of any
shareholder.99  For that reason, the provision was sent back to the Committee
for further consideration.100
The Committee modified the provision by requiring firm owners to pay
surtax on their share of the undistributed earnings of a business in those cases
where the undistributed amounts were beyond the reasonable needs of the busi-
ness.101  Before deciding to limit the rule in this way, the Committee received
the input of the Southern Railway Company, which cautioned against a rule
that would put firms in the position of having to defend a decision to reinvest
profits in the business.102  The Committee continued to draw no distinction
between corporations and other businesses.  Thus, the modified version applied
to both incorporated and unincorporated firms.103
Additional language was added to the original version to help clarify that
the surtax would only reach those instances in which an intention to avoid tax
motivated the decision not to distribute or divide profits.  Specifically, owners
would be taxed on their share of undistributed profits only when the companies
obtaining revenue a corporation might now and then pass up a portion of its profits to surplus or
otherwise refrain from distributing them.
50 CONG. REC.3774 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams).
98 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
99 This seems to be clear from the following exchange between Senators Root and Williams
on the floor of the Senate:
Mr. ROOT.  Mr. President, before the amendment goes back to the committee, I desire to ask
that the committee consider the question whether it is possible that the gains and profits referred
to in this provision can be regarded as the income of the individual stockholder when they are
not divided or distributed.  As I understand, this clause would have the effect of imposing an
income tax on the aliquot share of each stockholder of a corporation in that part of the profits of
the corporation for the year which might have been distributed but were not distributed.
Mr. WILLIAMS.  Not precisely that; but such part of the income of the partnership or corpora-
tion as a partnership or shareholder would have the legal right to force the distribution of.
. . . .
Mr. ROOT.  But taking it altogether, particularly considering the concluding words, I think it
does aim to tax as income of the stockholder the profits of the corporation which are not
divided. . . .
I understand the law to be—I think it is the law in all of our States—that no stockholder has
a right to demand a dividend from the profits of a corporation against the judgment of the direc-
tors or trustees of the corporation.
50 CONG. REC. 3774  (1913) (statements of Sens. Root and Williams).  There was little
concern about the longstanding practice of taxing partners on their share of partnership prof-
its.  This likely reflects the fact that by the time the Revenue Act of 1913 was under consid-
eration, a partnership had generally come to be viewed as an extension of its owners, not as a
separate entity. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT 1914, U.L.A. §§ 15, 25, 29.
100 However, Senator Borah openly noted that if the committee decided not to apply the
surtax to undistributed corporate profits, Congress would have to contend with reducing the
risk that large estates would incorporate in order to escape the surtax.  50 CONG. REC. 3775
(1913) (statement of Sen. Borah).
101 SEIDMAN, supra note 95, at 984.
102 See 50 CONG. REC. 4379 (1913).
103 SEIDMAN, supra note 95, at 983.
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(whether incorporated or not) were “formed or fraudulently availed of for the
purpose of preventing the imposition of such [surtax] through the medium of
permitting such gains and profits to accumulate . . . .”104  Senator Williams
explained the objective of the language this way:
It applies only to such profits and the heaping up of such surplus as shall justify the
Secretary of the Treasury in concluding that it is done for the purpose of evading the
tax.  Its main purpose is to prevent the formation of holding companies.105
The Senate Finance Committee’s adoption of a uniform rule for taxing the
undistributed profits of partnerships and corporations seems odd.  After all,
elsewhere in the legislation, the Committee specified that the partners of a part-
nership (but not the shareholders of a corporation) would have to pay tax on
their share of firm profits, whether distributed or not.106
By the time the bill was reconciled in the Conference Committee, the taxa-
tion of business profits under the surtax provisions underwent yet another
change so as to eliminate the law from having two inconsistent rules for taxing
the undistributed partnership profits.  Under the compromise, the surtax would
apply in two different ways, depending on whether the profits were derived
from an incorporated business or not.107  In the case of an unincorporated busi-
ness, each owner would have to pay the surtax on his share of the profits of the
business.108  This rule essentially replicated the approach taken for purposes of
the normal tax.  However, if the business was a corporation, the conferees took
a two pronged approach.  First, each shareholder was required to pay surtax on
any corporate profits actually distributed to him as a dividend.109  Second, the
shareholders would also have to pay surtax on their share of any profits that
were not distributed if the corporation’s failure to do so was motivated by a
desire to prevent the surtax from coming into play.110
Known as the accumulated earnings penalty tax, this latter provision was
distinctive in part because it was not self executing.  Instead, the government
had to detect cases of unlawful conduct and assess the tax.  When it did, the
104 Id. at 984.
105 50 CONG. REC. 4330, 4380 (1913) (statement of Sen. Williams).
106 50 CONG. REC. 3827, 3855 (1913) (“Provided further, That any persons carrying on
business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their individual capacity, and
the share of the profits of a partnership to which any taxable partner would be entitled if the
same were divided, whether divided or otherwise, shall be returned for taxation and the tax
paid, under the provisions of this section . . . .”).
107 SEIDMAN, supra note 95, at 983-84.
108 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(D), 38 Stat. 114, 169 (“Provided further, That any
persons carrying on business in partnership shall be liable for income tax only in their indi-
vidual capacity, and the share of the profits of a partnership to which any taxable partner
would be entitled if the same were divided, whether divided or otherwise, shall be returned
for taxation and the tax paid, under the provisions of this section . . . .”).
109 But cf. id. § II(B), 38 Stat. at 167 (allowing an individual to exclude dividends from
taxable income for purposes of the normal tax only).
110 Id. § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (“For the purpose of [the surtax] the taxable income of any
individual shall embrace the share to which he would be entitled of the gains and profits, if
divided or distributed, whether divided or distributed or not, of all corporations, joint-stock
companies, or associations however created or organized, formed or fraudulently availed of
for the purpose of preventing the imposition of such tax through the medium of permitting
such gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed . . . .”).
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government would have to establish that the failure to distribute profits was
motivated by the desire to avoid tax.  The 1913 Act identified two factors that
could independently be relied upon as prima facie evidence of a fraudulent
purpose to escape the surtax.  First, if the corporation was a mere holding com-
pany, that would constitute such prima facie evidence.111  However, the 1913
Act did not define what a holding company was.  Second, the fact that the
corporation permitted its gains and profits to accumulate beyond the reasonable
needs of the business would also constitute such prima facie evidence.112
However, the mere fact that the gains and profits were permitted to accumulate
and become surplus was not to be construed as evidence of a purpose to escape
the surtax unless the Secretary of the Treasury certified that such accumulation
was “unreasonable for the purposes of the business.”113  Thus, only certain
instances of undistributed surplus would be the target of the tax on the theory
that there were certain legitimate accumulations of surplus that could be distin-
guished from illegitimate accumulations.  However, Congress left it to the Sec-
retary of the Treasury to actually draw the distinctions and to make the
judgment call.
In any year the tax applied, the result was that the firm was taxed similar
to a partnership for purposes of the surtax, with the shareholders having to pay
tax both on amounts they actually received and their share of any undistributed
profits for the year.  However, it would be incorrect to say that the firm and its
shareholders were treated in a way that was identical to a partnership and its
partners.  A partner was not taxed on amounts actually received by the partner-
ship.  Rather, a partner was taxed solely on the partner’s share of profits
derived by the partnership in a given year, while any actual distributions were
tax free to the partner.  By contrast, under the rules of the accumulated earnings
tax, a shareholder remained subject to tax on any profits actually received from
the corporation as a dividend.  If in a later year, such a dividend consisted of
amounts that were previously taxed to the shareholder under the accumulated
earnings tax, that dividend would remain subject to tax.  There was no provi-
sion exempting such a dividend from the surtax.114
111 Id. § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 167.
112 Id.
113 Id. 
114 To that extent, the tax seems to operate as a penalty.  However, writing at a more con-
temporaneous time, one scholar concluded that the provision was “not, strictly speaking, a
penalty statute.”  Lucius A. Buck & Francis Shackelford, Retention of Earnings by Corpora-
tions Under the Income Tax Laws, 36 VA. L. REV. 141, 153 (1950).  However, he reached
this conclusion without considering whether shareholders would be taxed on dividends con-
sisting of profits that were previously taxed to them under the accumulated earnings rules in
prior years.  The one penal quality he did identify was the fact that the surtax would apply to
amounts “the corporation could have accumulated to meet its reasonable needs.” Id.  By that
measure, however, it would seem that the approach for taxing partnerships also had a penal
quality, since—under those rules—partners were not relieved of surtax on their share of
partnership profits retained by the firm to meet its reasonable needs.
As a matter of Congressional intent, however, the legislative history for the Revenue
Act of 1913 contains no evidence that lawmakers consciously intended a double tax to apply.
Congress affirmatively rejected such an idea five years later when it revised the accumulated
earnings tax.  Those amended rules expressly exempt from the surtax future distributions of
amounts that were previously taxed to shareholders.  There is no evidence that the change
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As a practical matter, however, it seems unlikely that this was an issue that
ever arose.  First, the accumulated earnings tax was assessed in extremely rare
situations.115  Second, in the event that it was assessed, it seems even more
unlikely that a corporation would have ever made a distribution of previously
taxed earnings in later years.  In order for it to have done so, it would have had
to pay dividends that exceeded its earnings for the current year.  That would
seem to be a remote possibility for a corporation that attempts to minimize the
profits it pays out in any given year.  In any event, by the time the 1913 Act
came into effect, it was already a well-established practice for corporations to
legitimately retain some portion of its annual earnings.116
In the end, the system for taxing business profits did not operate in a uni-
form way.  While all partnership profits were subject to as much as 7% in tax,
corporate profits would be subject to tax at that rate only when they were dis-
tributed to shareholders.  Corporate profits that were retained by the firm were
only subject to the 1% corporate tax.  These disparate rules for taxing firm
profits seem to be premised on the idea that certain undistributed corporate
earnings were entitled to partial tax relief that other forms of business profits
did not deserve.
It is far from clear that all members of Congress shared this view.  How-
ever, even if they did, the tax writers had reason to be concerned that taxpayers
would employ tactics that would cause “undeserving” business profits to qual-
ify for tax relief intended solely for corporate earnings that were retained to
meet the reasonable needs of the business.  After all, the system had a built-in
incentive for individuals to utilize corporations to conduct a business and for
such firms to retain as much profits as possible, not to pay them out to share-
holders.  This incentive was especially strong when the interests of the firm and
its owners were sufficiently aligned, such as when the firm was wholly owned
by one individual.  The accumulated earnings tax was the one tool adopted for
curbing such abusive practices.  It would soon be apparent whether it would
have the desired effect.
1917
Congress revisited its approach to the taxation of business profits only
four years after it adopted the country’s permanent income tax.117  In 1917,
Congress enacted the War Revenue Act, which actually consisted of two sets of
income taxes.118  Certain provisions amended the existing normal tax, surtax
was motivated by a desire to ease the burden of the tax.  To the contrary, as this Article
attempts to show, Congress consistently tried to strengthen it.
115 See 55 CONG. REC. 6162, 6172 (1917) (remarks of Sen. Simmons) (noting that the gov-
ernment prosecuted only two cases under the statute in the four years it was in effect).
116 Bank, supra note 37, at 918.
117 In the intervening years, Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1916.  Revenue Act of
1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756.  Its operative rules were similar to those of the Act it replaced.
However, the tax rates were adjusted.  Both the normal tax rate and the corporate tax rate
were increased from 1% to 2%. Id. § 1(a), 39 Stat. at 756; Id. § 10, 39 Stat. at 765.  In
addition, the schedule of surtax rates was expanded to cover thirteen tax brackets ranging
from 1% to 13%. Id. § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 756-57.
118 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (1917).
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and corporate tax statutes.  Other provisions constituted an entirely new tax on
income, referred to as the War Income Tax.119  Congress seemed as focused as
ever on the elimination of disparities in the way the law applied to business
profits.  Some of the provisions were intended to minimize such disparities.120
However, other rules seemed to make matters worse.  The War Income Tax fell
into the latter category.
The War Income Tax consisted of a normal tax on individuals, a surtax on
individuals, and a corporate tax.  The normal tax was a flat 2% tax on net
income in excess of an exempt amount.121  Meanwhile, the corporate tax was
set at 4%, marking the first time the corporate tax rate was not equal to the
normal tax rate for individuals and creating a new source of disparity in the
taxation of business profits.122  As under prior tax acts, corporate dividends
were exempt from the normal tax, while partnership profits were taxed to the
partners.123
The surtax component of the War Income Tax was structured as a set of
seventeen graduated rates ranging from 1% to 50%.124  The surtax applied to
an individual’s share of any partnership profits, whether distributed or not.125
However, if the profits were generated by a corporate business, the shareholder
had to pay surtax only on the amounts he received as a dividend.126  The net
effect of the War Income Tax was to perpetuate and magnify the disparities that
were already produced by the existing taxes on income.  Partnership profits
were subject to a combined tax of as much as 67%.  However, the combined
tax on corporate profits was as much as 69% if distributed and 6% if not dis-
tributed.  This combination of rules only increased the incentive for individuals
to form corporations and to refrain from paying out the firm’s earnings.
Congress made one noteworthy change to the existing corporate tax provi-
sions, hoping it would reduce some of the differences between the taxation of
corporate profits and other income, including partnership profits derived by
individuals. It supplemented the existing 2% corporate tax with an additional
tax on undistributed corporate profits.127  Under the new provision, a corpora-
tion had to pay a 10% tax on its after tax net income that remained undistrib-
uted six months after the end of the tax year.128  However, certain amounts of
119 The legislation also contained a title imposing a war excess profits tax on every corpora-
tion, partnership and individual. Id. §§ 200-214, 40 Stat. at 302-08.  These provisions
replaced the war excess profits tax that was passed earlier in the year, on March 3, 1917. Id.
§ 214, 40 Stat. at 308.
120 See, e.g., infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
121 War Revenue Act § 1, 40 Stat. at 300.  For purposes of the War Income Tax, the per-
sonal exemption was set at $1,000 for single individuals, and $2,000 for married couples and
heads of families. Id. § 3, 40 Stat. at 301.
122 Id. § 4, 40 Stat. at 302.
123 Id. § 3, 40 Stat. at 301. See also Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 5(b), 39 Stat. 756,
759-60 and § 8(e), 39 Stat. at 762.
124 The surtax came into play when net income exceeded $5,000.  The top rate applied when
net income exceeded $1 million.  War Revenue Act, § 2, 40 Stat. at 301.
125 Id. § 3, 40 Stat. at 300-01. See also Revenue Act of 1916 § 8(e), 39 Stat. at 762.
126 War Revenue Act, §3, 40 Stat. at 300-01. See also Revenue Act of 1916 § 5(b), 39 Stat.
at 759-60.
127 War Revenue Act § 1206(2), 40 Stat. at 333-34.
128 Id.
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undistributed earnings were exempt from this new tax.  First, the tax was not
imposed on amounts that were “actually invested and employed in the busi-
ness.”129  Second, the tax was not imposed on amounts that were “retained for
employment in the reasonable requirements of the business.”130  Third, the tax
was not imposed on amounts invested in obligations of the United States gov-
ernment.131  However, if the Secretary of the Treasury determined that any
amount retained for employment in the business was not so employed or was
not reasonably required in the business, then the corporation had to pay a 15%
tax on such amounts.132  This measure was viewed as an attempt to balance the
need to minimize disparities in the taxation of business profits without penaliz-
ing a corporation for investing in its future.133
Like the accumulated earnings tax,134 the tax on undistributed corporate
profits focused on the lack of parity in the taxation of undistributed corporate
profits and the taxation of profits from an unincorporated business.  However,
the two measures differed in some noteworthy ways.  First, the undistributed
earnings tax was designed to be self-assessed in the first instance, so that it
would be triggered in the absence of action by the Secretary of the Treasury.
By contrast, the accumulated earnings tax could be assessed only after the Sec-
retary of the Treasury had determined that the corporation had been formed or
availed of for the proscribed purpose.  The second major difference was that the
undistributed earnings tax was a tax on the corporation, while the accumulated
earnings tax was a tax on the shareholders.
The tax on undistributed corporate profits was the subject of considerable
debate.  The provision was added to the bill by the Senate Finance Committee.
Its members were motivated by a desire to restore a measure of parity between
the taxation of corporate profits and other income.135  At the same time, the
129 Id.
130 Id. 
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Summarizing the compromise reached by the Conference Committee, Senator Simmons
commented:
Of course, dividends declared by corporations have been subject to the surtax of the individual
stockholder receiving them, but neither the existing law nor the House bill require corporations
to distribute their earnings or impose any surtax or penalty upon such part of their earnings as
remain undistributed.  As a result the corporations of the country have accumulated large undi-
vided surpluses which have escaped the income surtax as long as they remained undistributed.  It
is evident that in these circumstances the greater the individual surtax the greater the inducement
to corporations to refrain from distributing their surpluses.
Your committee thought it expedient to devise some method of coercing distribution of
these earnings when not retained for the necessary requirements of the business.  With this end in
view the Senate adopted an amendment proposed by the Finance Committee imposing a tax of
10 per cent upon the undistributed surplus of a corporation but exempted from this tax such
retained surplus as the Secretary of the Treasury should ascertain and find was reasonably
required in the business and actually employed in it.
55 CONG. REC. 7605, 7615 (1917) (statement of Sen. Simmons).
134 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 3, 39 Stat. 756, 758.  The accumulated earnings tax
remained in effect.
135 According to the Senate Report:
Under both the House bill and existing law the normal tax of the corporation and the normal tax
of the individual is the same.  In these conditions the earnings of the corporation escape surtax
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Committee tried to be sensitive to evolving business practices.  The Committee
Report noted that larger and larger portions of corporate profits were not being
distributed, mostly because business began to view profits as way to finance
future investment and because other options for financing corporate growth had
become less attractive.136  Because this new practice necessarily prevented
such undistributed sums from being subject to the surtax, the Committee rea-
soned that the only way to address the situation was to impose a tax on at least
a portion of undistributed corporate profits.137
The Senate Finance Committee considered a number of alternatives before
settling on the measure that ultimately became law.  First, the Committee
thought it could completely eliminate disparities by applying to corporations
the rule that applied to partnerships, which would make a shareholder responsi-
ble for the surtax on his share of corporate profits whether paid out or not.138
This option was rejected because of the fear that there might be a constitutional
objection to taxing a shareholder on amounts that he did not actually receive.139
In addition, the Committee was concerned about the possibility that a minority
shareholder would be required to pay tax on income that he could not force the
corporation to pay to him.140
Having ruled out a shareholder level tax on undistributed corporate profits,
the Committee considered ways to impose the tax on the corporation itself.
The initial idea was to impose a flat tax of 15% on 80% of undistributed corpo-
rate earnings.141  That idea was met with protests from corporate interests, who
convinced the Committee that it would impose a serious handicap on business
conducted in corporate form because managers would be faced with the diffi-
cult choice of either distributing surplus or paying a tax that would have been
several times what it would cost to borrow the money in the open market.142
The Committee was persuaded that the practice of retaining corporate surplus
until distributed among its shareholders.  This situation seemed to your committee to bring about
an inequality between the corporation and the individual which should be remedied as far as
practicable.
S. REP. NO. 65-103, at 21 (1917).
136 Id. at 21-22.
137 Id.
In view of the fact that it has heretofore been the custom of corporations, for well recognized and
sound economic reasons to retain in the business a greater or less proportion of their annual
earnings, and in view of the further fact that the present situation calls for unusual outlays for
purposes of expansion, development, etc., to meet the demands and requirements of the situation,
and the increased difficulty in borrowing money on satisfactory terms and conditions caused by
the large demand of the Government upon the investing public to float its securities issued to
raise revenue for the war, your committee believes that the situation would be best met by
imposing the surtaxes above mentioned upon such portions of the retained surplus as is not
retained for employment in the business . . . .
Id. 
138 55 CONG. REC. 5947, 5966-67 (1917) (remarks of Senator Simmons).
139 Id. 
140 Id.  Accord 55 CONG. REC. 6310, 6335 (1917); 55 CONG. REC. 6162, 6173 (1917).
141 55 CONG. REC. 5947, 5966-67 (1917). Accord 55 CONG. REC. 6162, 6174 (1917).
142 55 CONG. REC. 5947, 5966-67 (1917) (remarks of Senator Simmons).
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was a longstanding and sound practice that should not be treated as an attempt
to avoid tax on the income.143
Although the Committee felt that corporations should not be penalized for
reinvesting profits in the business, it nevertheless believed that something had
to be done to establish greater parity between the taxation of partnership profits
and the taxation of corporate profits.144  The compromise was the provision
that became law:  a 10% tax on those undistributed profits that did not fall into
one of the exempt categories, supplemented by a provision to impose a 15% tax
on those profits that were found to be in excess of the reasonable requirements
of the business.145
Not everyone had high expectations that the law would achieve the Com-
mittee’s goal.  Senator Andrieus A. Jones expressed concern about whether it
was possible for the Secretary to perform the job required of him under the
legislation:
Mr. President, under that provision the duty is imposed upon the Secretary of
the Treasury to ascertain the reasonable business requirements of every corporation
in the United States.  It is estimated that next year there will be 400,000 of them, and
he is to find out not only what they are doing but whether they ought to do it or not;
to ascertain the reasonable requirements of every line of business under the sun, a
task absolutely impossible of execution, not only as to the varied classes of business
of the country but by reason of the enormous task of doing it. . . .
It is impossible from another point of view.  What are the reasonable business
requirements of the corporation?  What is the business in which its capital may be
employed or for which it may be reserved to be employed?  How are you going to
ascertain what is the business of the corporation?146
The Committee’s recommendation encountered a number of counterpro-
posals when it was debated on the Senate floor.  One of the more forceful cases
for a different approach was made by Senator Jones, who sat on the Finance
Committee but questioned the wisdom of the tax on undistributed profits.  He
stressed that corporate profits were undertaxed compared to profits derived
from unincorporated businesses, inspiring one of his colleagues to note how
this bias against the latter would only encourage such businesses to take on a
corporate form.147  At the same time, Senator Jones acknowledged that a cor-
poration should not be taxed on profits that were retained for reinvestment.148
However, he noted that unincorporated businesses were no less entitled to such
an exemption.149  To rectify the situation, he offered an unsuccessful amend-
ment that would have applied a 10% tax on the retained profits of any corpora-
tion in excess of $5,000.150  This would have eliminated the vague standard
that established an exemption for any amounts that were “reasonably” required
by a business.
143 Id. 
144 Id.
145 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1206(2), 40 Stat. 300, 334 (1917).
146 55 CONG. REC. 6162, 6173 (1917) (remarks of Sen. Jones).
147 55 CONG. REC. 6310, 6329 (1917) (colloquy between Sens. King and McCumber).
148 55 CONG. REC. 6162, 6175 (1917) (remarks of Sen. Jones).
149 Id. at 6171, 6173, 6175.
150 Id.
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The Senate also entertained the idea of allowing all businesses, whether
incorporated or not, to retain a certain amount of earnings tax free.151  The idea
was to permit both incorporated and unincorporated businesses to exclude from
tax amounts that were not in excess of the reasonable needs of the business.
However, that idea was thought to put tax collections in jeopardy.152  One Sen-
ator, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, suggested that the idea would be improved if the
exemption only applied to 5% of the profits of a business.153
Chairman Furnifold M. Simmons of the Senate Finance Committee
defended the proposal on several grounds.  First justifying it as a form of rough
justice, he contended that the tax collected under the proposal would roughly
equal the tax that would be collected if profits in excess of reasonable business
needs were distributed and subject to surtax at the shareholder level.154  Sec-
ond, he explained that the Committee viewed the measure as one that would
encourage more corporate distributions.155  Another Committee member, Sena-
tor Porter McCumber, explained that members made a conscious tradeoff when
they voted for the measure: they were prepared to permit a portion of corporate
profits to go untaxed currently so that the business could invest its surplus in
ways that would produce larger taxable corporate profits in future years.156
Whatever motivated Congress to design the measure as it did, the resolu-
tion was neither easy to reach nor without its critics.  Perhaps that problem
explains why Congress would find itself revisiting the issue and resolving it
differently only one year later.
1918
In the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress adjusted the income tax system in
ways to make it even more progressive.157  In that context, Congress had to
consider yet again the ever growing disparities in the way business profits were
taxed and the options for reducing that disparity.  As it did in 1917, Congress
enacted some provisions that restored a measure of parity by counteracting the
effects produced by other parts of the existing law.158  Other provisions under-
went adjustments intended to enhance their efficacy.159  The fact that Congress
made further adjustments only three years later would suggest that the results
were not entirely satisfactory.160
Congress continued its tradition of tinkering with the tax rates on individu-
als and corporations.  This time, however, it did not just adjust the surtax.  It
also restructured the normal tax by replacing the single flat rate with a gradu-
ated tax consisting of two brackets.  Under the normal tax for calendar year
151 55 CONG. REC. 6310, 6330-31, 6336 (1917) (remarks of Sen. McCumber).
152 Id. at 6332 (remarks of Sen. Simmons) (speculating that it would result in 50% fewer tax
collections).
153 Id. at 6336 (remarks of Sen. Hitchcock).
154 Id. (remarks of Sen. Simmons).
155 Id. at 6335.
156 Id. at 6334 (remarks of Sen. McCumber).
157 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057.
158 See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
159 See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
160 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252.
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1918, the first $4,000 of net income above an exempt amount was taxed at 6%,
while any remaining net income was taxed at 12%.161  As under existing law,
the normal tax applied to an individual’s share of partnership profits.162  How-
ever, corporate dividends were exempt from this tax.163  To make up for this
exemption, the corporation had to pay a 12% tax on its net income.164
The adoption of a two-tiered normal tax alongside a flat corporate tax
perpetuated and magnified the disparities between the taxation of corporate
profits and the taxation of other business profits.  Now, in the few cases where
a married shareholder’s income did not exceed the relatively modest $2,000
exemption, there would be a 12% tax on income that would otherwise be tax
free.  In addition, if the shareholder’s income fell between $2,000 and $6,000,
the corporate tax would be double the tax the shareholder would pay on his
share of profits from an unincorporated business.  Under existing law, by con-
trast, corporate dividends were overtaxed in those few cases in which a married
couple’s income did not exceed a $4,000 exemption amount.165
After 1918, the normal tax rates were scheduled to be adjusted in a way
that would magnify the disparities even further.  Starting in 1919, the first
$4,000 of net income above an exempt amount was taxed at 4%, while all other
net income was taxed at 8%.166  By contrast a flat tax of 10% applied to corpo-
rate profits, higher than both rates established for the normal tax.167  As a
result, corporate dividends were overtaxed in all cases, with the difference
being no less than two percentage points.
The corporate tax on undistributed earnings was repealed.168  Meanwhile,
the individual surtax was restructured to consist of fifty-four brackets ranging
from 1% to 65%.169
The structure of the corporate tax was the result of a compromise.  Under
the bill, reported out of the Ways and Means Committee and passed by the
House, a corporation was subject to a two-tiered tax.170  A 12% tax applied to
that portion of the corporation’s net income that was either:  distributed to
shareholders as dividends; paid out to satisfy certain debts of the corporation;
or paid out to buy Liberty Bonds.171  Meanwhile, an 18% tax applied to the rest
161 Revenue Act of 1918 § 210(a), 40 Stat. at 1062.  When computing net income for pur-
poses of the normal tax only, a single person was allowed to exclude $1,000, while a married
couple or head of a family could exclude $2,000. Id. § 216(c), 40 Stat. at 1069.  In addition,
any taxpayer was entitled to reduce his net income by an additional $200 for each dependent
he could claim. Id. § 216(d), 40 Stat. at 1069.
162 Id. § 218(a), 40 Stat. at 1070.
163 Id. § 216(a), 40 Stat. at 1069.
164 Id. § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1076.  A corporation was allowed to reduce its net income by
$2,000 for purposes of computing its income tax liability. Id. § 236(c), 40 Stat. at 1080.
165 The existing exemption for an unmarried individual was $3,000.  Revenue Act of 1916,
ch. 463, § 7(a), 39 Stat. 756, 761, amended by War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1203(1), 40 Stat.
300, 331 (1917).
166 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 210(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1062.
167 Id. § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. at 1076.
168 Id. § 230(a), 40 Stat. at 1075.
169 Id. § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64.
170 H.R. REP. NO. 65-767, at 12 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 86, 94.
171 Id. at 4, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 94.
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of the corporation’s net income.172  This compares to a two-tiered normal tax
that imposed a 4% levy on the first $4,000 of an individual’s income and 12%
on the rest.173
The House adopted this plan, but the Senate Finance Committee rejected
it, believing that the plan failed to acknowledge that a corporation should not be
taxed at a higher rate on amounts spent on investments that would lead to
increased production in future years.174  Indeed this approach was the exact
reverse of the one taken under the undistributed profits tax, which did not
impose tax on amounts reinvested in the business.  However, the Committee
openly acknowledged that it would be difficult to design a system that would
relieve from tax all “legitimate uses of earnings.”  Such legitimate uses
included, in particular, amounts that a corporation invested in the business.175
Because it was impossible to implement such a system, the Committee decided
to restore the flat 12% tax (8% after 1918) on corporations, but to limit the war-
excess profits to corporations.176  Thus, the Senate Finance Committee viewed
the flat rate as the best of all options and appeared to view the war-excess
profits tax on corporations as a substitute for a tax on undistributed earnings.177
The two competing measures were reconciled in the Conference Commit-
tee.  Under that compromise, the House reluctantly agreed to restore the flat tax
on the condition that it would be set at 10% after 1918, not the 8% that was part
of the bill passed by the Senate.178  The House Conferees also believed that the
pressure to raise revenue had been considerably reduced between the time the
measure was voted out of committee and the time it was in the hands of the
Conference Committee.  When the Ways and Means Committee was drafting
the bill, World War I was still ongoing, and the 18% tax was part of an overall
effort to generate all the revenue that the government could reasonably jus-
tify.179  The Conferees were particularly mindful of the fact that the high surtax
rates on individual incomes would increase the incentive for corporations to
accumulate profits and to not pay them out to shareholders as dividends.180  By
the time the Conferees met to reconcile the competing revenue bills, the war
was over and the government was not under the same pressure to raise money.
However, even if the government’s need for money had declined, one would
still have to question whether the bill contained adequate safeguards or incen-
tives to prevent the unreasonable accumulation of corporate profits.
Congress changed the surtax by adding more brackets and increasing the
tax rate for the highest bracket.  Under the 1918 Act, there were fifty-four sur-
172 Id.
173 Id., reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 88.
174 S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 4-5 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 117, 120.  Senator Penrose
described the arrangement in the House bill as one that would penalize corporations that
practiced “conservative methods of business administration which have characterized the
most wisely handled corporations.”  57 CONG. REC. 549 (1918).
175 S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 4-5, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. at 120.
176 Id.
177 57 CONG. REC. 3010 (1919) (exchange between Reps. Stafford and Kitchin).
178 Id. at 3003-05 (remarks of Rep. Kitchin); id. at 3132 (remarks of Sen. Simmons).
179 Id. at 3005 (remarks of Rep. Kitchin).
180 Id.
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tax brackets (up from thirteen) with rates ranging from 1% to 65%.181  As in all
past revenue acts, the surtax applied to an individual’s share of partnership
profits, whether distributed or not, but it only applied to an individual’s share of
corporate profits actually distributed.182  The 1917 War Revenue Act addressed
this disparity by taxing a corporation on a portion of its undistributed profits in
addition to imposing a tax on illegitimately accumulated corporate earnings.183
One year later, Congress discarded the tax on undistributed corporate profits
and again relied solely on the accumulated earnings tax with substantial
modifications.184
Under the revised version of the accumulated earnings tax, any corpora-
tion that fraudulently accumulated earnings was subject to the rules that apply
to personal service corporations, while the corporate income tax did not
apply.185  The personal service corporation rules required the shareholders to
be taxed on their share of firm profits as if they were members of a partner-
ship.186  The result was that each shareholder would have to pay the normal tax
and the surtax on their share of firm profits, whether he received any or not.187
To make up for the absence of a tax on undistributed profits, Congress
restricted the war-excess profits tax to corporations.188  This restriction repre-
sented a change from existing law, which imposed the war-profits tax on corpo-
rations, partnerships and individuals alike.189
Limiting the application of the war-profits tax to corporations did not
eliminate the tax advantage that at least some corporate businesses enjoyed
over their partnership counterparts.  In fact, it may have made matters worse,
creating a greater incentive for partnerships to convert to corporate form.  This
seems to be the conclusion drawn by the drafters when they met in conference
to reconcile the measures passed by the House and Senate.
The Revenue Act of 1918 was not passed until February 24, 1919, yet its
provisions were applicable starting in 1918.190  This meant that if a partnership
decided that it would be better off operating as a corporation under the new
181 The 1% surtax applied on net income above $5,000 and up to $8,000, while the 65
percent surtax applied to net income in excess of $1 million.  Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18,
§ 211(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1062–64.  Individuals were no longer subject to the war profits tax
enacted as part of the 1917 War Revenue Act.
182 Id. § 213(a), 40 Stat. at 1065; id. § 218(a), 40 Stat. at 1070.
183 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1206(2), 40 Stat. 300, 334 (1917).
184 Revenue Act of 1918 § 230(a), 40 Stat. at 1075.
185 Id. § 220, 40 Stat. at 1072.
186 Id. § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070.
187 The application of section 220 appeared to be quite cumbersome.  The Treasury declared
in an early pronouncement that “[w]hether a corporation is taxable under section 220 can not
be determined in advance; it must be determined at a later date in the light of what it has
actually done with the profits retained.”  T.B.M. 2, 1 C.B. 181 (1919).  The implication is
that the corporation and its shareholders would report income and pay tax as if the provision
did not apply.  If the government determined that the provision did apply, then adjustments
would have to be made at both the firm level and the shareholder level to conform to reverse
the original treatment and to conform with partnership treatment.
188 S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 4-5 (1918), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 117, 124. See also Revenue
Act of 1918 § 300, 40 Stat. at 1088.
189 War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 201, 40 Stat. 300, 303 (1917).
190 See, e.g., Revenue Act of 1918 § 210(a), 40 Stat. at 1057.
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law, it would have missed out on a full year of tax savings even if it underwent
a conversion immediately after the 1918 Act was signed into law.  Congress
addressed the situation by permitting any partnership or sole proprietorship that
incorporated before July 1919 to be treated as a corporation retroactively to
January 1, 1918.191  In one respect, this provision stands as a concession that
the government’s attempts to level the playing field had fallen short.  On the
other hand, one might view the provision as an invitation to engage in a form of
self-help.
The tax laws did not favor all corporate enterprises, paradoxically leading
Congress to enact a provision that treated certain disfavored businesses as part-
nerships for tax purposes.  The provision addressed so-called personal service
corporations, which referred to any corporation whose income was derived pri-
marily from the activities of the principal owners who were also actively and
regularly engaged in the business in which capital was not a material income
producing factor.192  These businesses were at risk of being taxed out of exis-
tence if they were subject to both the corporate tax and to the war-excess profits
tax.193
Lawmakers were slow to identify a suitable way to address the predica-
ment of personal service corporations.  Under the bill reported out of the House
Ways and Means Committee, a maximum excess profits tax of 20% would
have applied to the earnings of any corporation whose activities were to be
ascribed to its stockholders and not to the invested capital.194  Meanwhile, the
Senate bill imposed an 8% flat tax on the net income of such corporations.195
The Conferees eventually resolved the situation by treating a personal service
corporation like a partnership.196  Thus, the business was not subject to the
12% (falling to 10% after 1918) corporate tax.197  Instead, the shareholders
were taxed on both any amounts they actually received from the corporation
and their share of any undistributed profits derived by the corporation during
191 Id. § 330, 40 Stat. at 1094; 57 CONG. REC. 3269 (1919) (remarks of Sen. Smoot).  This
election was only available to a business in which capital was a material income producing
factor.  Revenue Act of 1918 § 330, 40 Stat. at 1094.
192 Revenue Act of 1918 § 200, 40 Stat. at 1059.  However, the term did not refer to any
corporation where at least 50% of the gross income was derived from trading as a principal.
Id.
193 57 CONG. REC. 3135-36 (1919) (remarks of Sen. Simmons). See also 57 CONG. REC.
501 (1918) (remarks of Sen. Smoot).  This is so because a corporation’s war-excess profits
tax liability was tied to the amount of its invested capital.  Revenue Act of 1918, § 301(a)-
(b), 40 Stat. at 1088.  A personal service corporation is unlikely to have any invested capital.
A company with no invested capital would pay the lower of two amounts.  The first was a
65% tax on its net income in excess of $3,000 in 1918.  The second was a 30% tax on net
income between $3,000 and up to $20,000 and an 80% tax on its net income over $20,000.
Id. § 302, 40 Stat. at 1089.  In either case, the tax would be in addition to the corporate tax of
12%.  This arrangement compares to the graduated surtax rates imposed on individual
incomes, which ranged from 1% to 65% under the Act.  Moreover, the combination of cor-
porate level taxes would be supplemented by the individual surtax on any amounts distrib-
uted by the corporation to its shareholders.
194 57 CONG. REC. 3008 (1919) (remarks of Rep. Kitchin).
195 Id. at 3136 (remarks of Sen. Simmons).
196 Revenue Act of 1918 § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070.
197 Id. § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070; id. § 230(a), 40 Stat. at 1075-76.
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the year.198  The measure was lauded for establishing parity in the taxation of
personal service corporations, partnerships and sole proprietors.199
The accumulated earnings tax provisions reappeared in the 1918 Act as
they had in all past revenue acts (other than the War Revenue Act of 1917).  Its
provisions continued to apply to shareholders of corporations that improperly
accumulated earnings in order to prevent the income from being subject to the
shareholder level surtax.  However, the rules were modified slightly.  Under the
1918 Act, such corporations were subject to the same rules as a personal ser-
vice corporation.200  Thus, any dividends actually received would be subject to
both the normal tax and the surtax at the shareholder level.201  The corporation
itself was not subject to the corporate tax, as had been the case under prior
law.202  Instead, starting in 1918, a corporation appeared to have nothing to
lose by unlawfully accumulating its profits.  If it was detected, the government
would have made adjustments consistent with treating the business as a partner-
ship, which is what it should have done in the first place.  However, that analy-
sis overlooks the fact that the corporation would still have to pay the war-
profits tax.203
The accumulated earnings tax rules were modified in one additional way.
Under prior versions of the rule, the tax would not kick in unless there was
evidence that the corporation was “fraudulently” availed of to avoid the surtax
on individuals.  The 1918 Act eliminated the requirement of proving fraud
when earnings of a corporation were allowed to accumulate for the purpose of
preventing the imposition of the surtax upon the stockholders.  Congress
believed that the provision had proved to be of little value when such proof was
a required element.204
1921
Congress waited just two years before revisiting the nation’s income tax
laws.  The changes it made increased existing disparities between the taxation
of corporate profits and the taxation of profits from other businesses, increasing
yet again the incentive to engage in forms of tax avoidance.  Because the
changes effectively gave corporations that retained profits a greater tax advan-
tage than they had before, the law increased the pressure on the rules directed at
penalizing abuses of the corporate form.
198 Id. § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070.
199 57 CONG. REC. 3136 (1919) (remarks of Sen. Simmons).
200 Revenue Act of 1918 § 220, 40 Stat. at 1072.
201 Under normal circumstances, the dividend would have been exempt from the normal tax.
However, under the personal service corporation rules, the dividend looses its status as such,
preventing the payment from qualifying as an exempt receipt for purposes of the normal tax.
See id. § 218(e), 40 Stat. at 1070.
202 Id. § 220, 40 Stat. at 1072.
203 Id. § 200, 40 Stat. at 1059; H.R. REP. NO. 65-1037, at 52-53 (1919).
204 S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 5 (1918).  When describing the need to eliminate the element of
fraud, Senator Simmons described the class of cases that were the target of the provision:
“There is no doubt but that there are a number of so called close corporations, corporations
with only a small number of stockholders, that have been organized primarily for the pur-
pose of availing themselves of the privilege of retention to escape surtaxes upon their earn-
ings.”  57 CONG. REC. 253 (1918).
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Congress increased the corporate tax rate and eliminated the war-profits
tax on corporations.205  Under the Revenue Act of 1921, a corporation had to
pay a 12.5% tax on its entire net income, up from 10% under the existing
law.206  At the same time, the war-profits tax was scheduled to expire after
1921.207  This was significant because the war-profits tax was initially viewed
as a stand-in for a tax on undistributed corporate profits.208  Now, there was
neither a tax on undistributed profits, nor a substitute for one.  Perhaps the
increase in the corporate tax was meant to fill the gap.  The absence of a war-
excess profits tax also meant that existing tax law no longer needed to treat a
personal service corporation as a partnership.  Understandably, the personal
service corporation rules expired along with the war-profits tax after 1921.209
Meanwhile, the legislation did not materially change the tax on individu-
als.  It retained the two-tiered rate structure that was then part of the normal tax,
with the first $4,000 of an individual’s net income above an exempt amount
being taxed at 4%, and all other net income taxed at 8%.210  Individuals also
remained liable for the surtax under a schedule of fifty-four rates ranging from
1% to 65% for 1921.211  Starting in 1922, the schedule contained forty-eight
rates ranging from 1% to 50%.212  Any partner in a partnership remained liable
for both the normal tax and the surtax on his share of partnership profits,
whether he received them as a distribution or not.213  Corporate profits distrib-
uted as a dividend remained exempt from the normal tax but subject to the
surtax.214
The provisions of the 1921 Act remained in effect until 1924.215  How-
ever, an individual’s tax liability for 1923 was retroactively reduced by 25%.216
The reduction could either be refunded to the taxpayer or used by him as a
credit against future tax liability.217
205 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252.
206 Id.  A corporation was generally allowed to reduce its net income by $2,000 when com-
puting its income tax liability. Id. § 236(b), 42 Stat. at 257.
207 Jesse I. Miller, High Lights of the Federal Revenue Act of 1921, 95 CENT. L.J. 106, 108
(1922).
208 S. REP. NO. 65-617, at 4-5, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 117, 124. See also Revenue Act of
1918 § 300, 40 Stat. at 1088.
209 Miller, supra note 207, at 108.
210 Revenue Act of 1921 § 210, 42 Stat. at 233.  However, the 1921 Act did change the
exemptions that were available to individuals.  When computing net income for purposes of
the normal tax only, a single person was allowed to exclude $1,000, while a married couple
or head of a family could exclude $2,500 (up from $2,000). Id. § 216(c), 42 Stat. at 243.
However, the exclusion was capped at $2,000 for any married couple or head of a family
whose net income exceeded $5,000. Id.  In addition, any taxpayer was entitled to reduce his
net income by an additional $400 (up from $200) for each dependent he could claim. Id.
§ 216(d), 42 Stat. at 243.
211 A 1% tax applied to net income over $5,000 and up to $6,000, while the 65% tax applied
to net income over $1 million. Id. § 211(a)(1), 42 Stat. at 233-35.
212 A 1% tax applied to net income over $6,000 and up to $10,000, while a 50% tax applied
to net income over $200,000. Id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37.
213 Id. § 218(a), 42 Stat. at 245.
214 Id. § 216(a), 42 Stat. at 242.
215 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 1104, 43 Stat. 253, 353.
216 Id. § 1200(a), 43 Stat. at 353.
217 Id.
\\server05\productn\N\NVJ\9-1\NVJ108.txt unknown Seq: 29  3-MAR-09 14:58
158 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:130
The combination of provisions in the 1921 Act made it even less attractive
for a corporation to distribute its profits to its shareholders.  Any dollar of prof-
its would have already been subject to a 12.5% tax paid by the corporation.  In
addition, any after-tax profits distributed to a shareholder would have been sub-
ject to a surtax of as much as 50%.218  Meanwhile, any dollar that the corpora-
tion did not distribute would have been subject to the 12.5% corporate tax and
no other tax.219  Not only did a corporation have a greater incentive to retain as
much profits as it could, when it did so, it operated at a far greater advantage
over any partnership.  Any dollar of partnership profits would have been sub-
ject to a normal tax up to 8% and a surtax up to 65% for 1921 (reduced to 50%
starting in 1922), a combined tax that far exceeded the 12.5% corporate tax on
undistributed corporate profits.
The incentives built into the 1921 Act resulted in a need to fortify the
penalties for abusive practices.  Congress revised the accumulated earnings
penalty tax in a way that would increase the price to a corporation that failed to
distribute enough of its profits.  Under the 1921 Act, a corporation had to pay a
25% penalty tax on its net income in addition to the 12.5% corporate tax that
had already been paid.220  Moreover, the surtax of up to 50% would have
applied to any after tax profits that were later distributed to shareholders.221
Under prior law, the shareholders were required to pay the penalty by treating
the undistributed profits as if they were distributed.222  The change in proce-
dure was adopted in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Eisner v. Macomber,223 which cast doubt on the constitutionality of taxing
stockholders on the undistributed profits of a corporation.224
The 1921 Act gave the Commissioner the power to waive the accumulated
earnings penalty if the shareholders agreed to be taxed on their share of firm
profits as if the firm were a partnership.225  This election was only available
when the corporation had been found to have unlawfully accumulated prof-
its.226  In the event such permission was granted, the corporation would not be
liable for any income tax, war profits, or excess profits tax for the year.227  A
corporation could not eliminate its exposure to the accumulated earnings pen-
alty by electing to treat the corporation as a partnership for income tax pur-
poses.228  Senator Andrieus A. Jones of New Mexico suggested that the option
of taxing corporate profits under the partnership rules should be available to all
218 Revenue Act of 1921 § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37.
219 Id. § 230, 42 Stat. at 252.
220 Id. § 220, 42 Stat. at 247.
221 Id. § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37.
222 Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 218(e), 40 Stat. 1057, 1070.
223 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
224 H.R. REP. NO. 67-350, at 12-13 (1921); S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 16 (1921).  The Eisner
court concluded that a shareholder could not be taxed on the value of a dividend paid in the
form of stock in the dividend paying corporation. Eisner, 252 U.S. at 219.
225 Revenue Act of 1921 § 220, 42 Stat. at 247-48.  This procedure would apply only if the
shareholders unanimously agreed to it and if the Commissioner also consented. Id.
226 Id. § 220, 42 Stat. at 248.
227 Id. § 220, 42 Stat, at 247.
228 See I.T. 1289, I-1 C.B. 218 (1922).  In that case the stockholders sought permission to be
taxed as members of a partnership on the profits of the corporation whose retained profits
were to be reinvested in the business. Id.  That request was denied on the grounds that the
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corporations, not just those that were determined to be organized for the pur-
pose of avoiding the surtax.229  That suggestion was rejected.230
1924
The 1924 Act perpetuated the disparate taxation of business profits.
Understanding that the rules created growing incentives for individuals to use
corporations to avoid tax, Congress placed greater emphasis on the accumu-
lated earnings tax as a device for discouraging undesirable practices.  However,
the provisions were clearly having very little impact, and some openly doubted
whether fortifying penalties would help.
Congress did not change the corporate tax in 1924, keeping it as a 12.5%
tax on corporate net income.231  However, Congress restructured and lowered
both the normal tax and the surtax on individuals from the levels established in
1921. Under the Revenue Act of 1924, the normal tax on individuals was
restructured to consist of three tiers:  a 2% tax applied to the first $4,000 of net
income above an exempt amount; a 4% tax applied to the next $4,000 of net
income; and a 6% tax applied to the remaining net income.232  By contrast, the
top rate under existing law was 8%.  The surtax was also restructured to consist
of forty brackets (down from forty-eight) with rates ranging from 1% to
40%.233  This compared to a 50% top rate under existing law.  As in past reve-
nue laws, if an individual was a partner in a partnership, that person had to
include in net income his share of the profits of the partnership.234  Dividends
were exempt from the normal tax on individuals, but not the surtax.235
By lowering the tax on individuals while making no changes to the corpo-
rate tax, Congress slightly reduced the comparative tax advantage enjoyed by
corporations.  However, the advantage was still considerable.  Corporations
still paid a high tax cost for distributing its profits to shareholders.  Any dollar
of profits would be subject to a 12.5% tax paid by the corporation.  An addi-
tional tax of 40% would apply at the shareholder level.  By contrast, any dollar
option was only available to a corporation that accumulated earnings in order to avoid the
surtax. Id. at 219.
229 61 CONG. REC. 7483 (1921) (statement of Sen. Jones).
230 61 CONG. REC. 7483 (1921).
231 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282.  In addition, as under prior law,
the corporation was generally permitted to reduce its net income by $2,000 for purposes of
computing its income tax liability. Id. § 236, 43 Stat. at 285.
232 Id. § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264.  A single person was permitted to reduce his net income by
$1,000 when computing his normal tax liability, while a married couple or the head of a
family could reduce his net income by $2,500 when computing his normal tax liability. Id.
§ 216(c), 43 Stat. at 272.  In addition, any taxpayer was entitled to reduce his net income by
an additional $400 for each dependent he could claim. Id.§ 216(d), 43 Stat. at 272.  These
adjustments were identical to those included in the 1918 Act, except that the exclusion avail-
able to high income couples or family heads was limited to $2,000.
233 The 1% surtax applied to net income above $10,000 and up to $14,000, while the 40%
top rate applied to net income over $500,000. Id. § 211(a), 43 Stat. at 265-67.  The 1924
Act also retroactively reduced income taxes on individuals for 1923 by 25%. Id. § 1200, 43
Stat. at 353.
234 Id. § 218(a), 43 Stat. at 275.
235 Id. § 216(a), 43 Stat. at 272.
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that the corporation did not distribute would have been subject to the 12.5%
corporate tax and no other tax.  Not only were corporate distributions overtaxed
compared to a corporation’s undistributed profits, they were also overtaxed
compared to the profits of a partnership, which would incur as much as a 6%
normal tax and a 40% surtax.  A tax on undistributed corporate profits would
have reduced the advantage enjoyed by corporations.  The Senate passed a ver-
sion of the 1921 bill including such a measure.236  However, the provision was
dropped from the bill reported by the Conference Committee.237
Both houses of Congress continued to rely on the accumulated earnings
penalty tax to discourage the illegitimate use of corporations to evade taxes.
The bill reported out of the House Committee on Ways and Means did not
change the existing penalty tax rate.  Thus, it provided for a 25% penalty tax on
corporate net income.238  The House bill also retained the existing provision
that relieved the corporation of the accumulated earnings penalty if the share-
holders agreed to be taxed on the corporation’s earnings as if they were part-
ners in a partnership.239  The Senate Committee eliminated the option as a
result of a decision to increase the penalty tax rate to 50%, which was consid-
ered to place a more effective check on the evasion of the individual surtax.240
The Senate amendment was ultimately adopted.241
Lawmakers were acutely aware that the accumulated earnings tax did not
have a very good track record of discouraging tax evasion.242  The minority
report of the Senate Finance Committee expressed its frustrations this way:
It is true a penalty against the organization of a corporation for the sole purpose of
evading taxation is included in the present law and increased in the proposed bill.  In
actual result, however, such penalty provision has been and will be for all practical
purposes a nullity.  The penalty of the present law has only been applied in one or
two cases.  The Secretary testified before the committee that corporations were not
being availed of so as to result in a decrease in taxation.  Before another committee
of the Senate a prominent attorney from the city of New York testified that such was
generally being done.  We believe that so long as the inducements exist in the law
they will be availed of by interested taxpayers.243
236 Steven A. Bank, Is Double Taxation a Scapegoat for Declining Dividends? Evidence
from History, 56 TAX L. REV. 463, 503 (2003).
237 Id. at 504.
238 H.R. REP. NO. 68-179, at 21-22 (1924).  However, the House bill did include other
amendments designed to eliminate opportunities for a corporation to fall outside the scope of
the rule.  Under existing law, a corporation that accumulated dividends from other corpora-
tions and interest on Liberty bonds would not run afoul of the prohibition against unreasona-
ble accumulations of earnings.  The proposed amendments eliminated that flexibility. Id. at
22.  Those changes ultimately became law. See Revenue Act of 1924 § 220(d), 43 Stat. at
277.
239 See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
240 S. REP. NO. 67-275, at 26 (1921).
241 Revenue Act of 1924 § 220(a), 43 Stat. at 277.
242 During the floor debates on the 1924 Act, Senator George Norris of Nebraska observed
that the use of corporations to evade surtax was a routine device for evading the surtax:
“Everybody knows that it is quite common for men to escape taxation on incomes from
Liberty bonds by organizing corporations really for the purpose of holding those Liberty
bonds, and thus escaping the surtaxes they would have to pay if they owned them individu-
ally.”  65 CONG. REC. 7359 (1924) (statement of Sen. Norris).
243 S. REP. NO. 68-398, pt. 2, at 9 (1924).
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After a ten year run, the accumulated earnings tax had not proved to be
equal to the challenge of curbing abuses of the corporate form.  Corporations
were widely used to shelter income from the surtaxes that would have other-
wise applied.  Congress may have had ample reason to justify giving partial tax
relief to corporate profits that were retained for legitimate purposes.  However,
business profits were not being taxed in the way desired by the drafters of the
law, primarily because it did not (and perhaps could not) distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate accumulated earnings in any clear way.  That undermined the
effectiveness of the accumulated earnings tax in at least two ways.  First, it
necessarily meant that any earnings retained by a corporation, both legitimate
and illegitimate, would enjoy partial tax relief, at least until the abusive practice
was detected and prosecuted.  However, the agencies responsible for enforcing
the law could only go after the most egregious cases because they lacked the
resources to go pursue all potential cases.  Besides, the absence of a clear stan-
dard meant that it would have been risky for the agency to pursue borderline
cases.  As a result, the vast majority of abusive practices simply were not penal-
ized.  That meant that there were substantial numbers of cases where illegiti-
mately accumulated earnings were undertaxed in practice.
1926
The 1924 Act was amended by the Revenue Act of 1926, which became
effective on January 1, 1925.244  The principal effect of the law was to lower
the rates for the normal tax and the surtax, while raising the corporate tax rate.
The 1926 Act retained the three-tiered structure of the normal tax, but
reduced the tax rate for each of the tax brackets:  a 1.5% tax (down from 2%)
applied to the first $4,000 of net income above an exemption amount; a 3% tax
(down from 4%) applied to the next $4,000 of net income; and a 5% tax (down
from 6%) applied on the rest of an individual’s net income.245  The surtax was
restructured to consist of twenty brackets, down from forty under prior law.246
Moreover the rates were substantially reduced, ranging from 1% to 20%.247
These rates compared to 1% to 40% under prior law.
The corporate tax rate moved in the opposite direction, rising from 12.5%
to 13% for 1925 and increasing further to 13.5% starting in 1926.248  Aside
from these changes in the rates, the basic structure of the income tax system
244 Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200(a), 44 Stat. 9, 125.
245 Id. § 210(a), 44 Stat. at 21.  The legislation also increased the personal exemptions that
were available to individuals.  A single person was permitted to reduce his net income by
$1,500 (up from $1,000) when computing his liability for the normal tax. Id. § 216(c), 44
Stat. at 29.  Meanwhile a married couple or head of a family could reduce his net income by
$3,500 (up from $2,500) when computing his liability for the normal tax. Id.  In addition,
any taxpayer was entitled to reduce his net income by an additional $400 for each dependent
he could claim, the same as under prior law. Id. § 216(d), 44 Stat. at 29.
246 Id. § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 21-23; Revenue Act of 1924 § 211(a), 43 Stat. at 265-67.
247 The 1% surtax applied to net income over $10,000 and up to $14,000; the 20% surtax
applied to net income over $100,000.  Revenue Act of 1926 § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 21–23.
248 Id. § 230(a)(1)-(2), 44 Stat. at 39.  As under prior law, the corporation was allowed to
reduce its net income by $2,000 for purposes of computing its income tax liability. Id.
§ 236(b), 44 Stat. at 43.
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remained the same.  Thus, an individual had to pay normal tax and surtax on
his share of any partnership profits.249  Meanwhile corporate dividends
received by an individual were subject to the surtax but exempt from the nor-
mal tax.250
The incremental increase in the corporate tax rate, coupled with the sub-
stantial cut in the normal and surtaxes, reduced the tax advantage that undistrib-
uted corporate profits enjoyed over partnership profits (whether distributed or
not) and distributed corporate profits.
Perhaps recognizing a reduced incentive to retain corporate profits for ille-
gitimate purposes, Congress adjusted the accumulated earnings penalty tax.  As
in the past, the corporation remained liable for a 50% tax on its net income, in
addition to the corporate tax.251  However, Congress restored a modified ver-
sion of the option that relieved a corporation of its obligation to pay the pen-
alty.  Under the revised provision, a corporation would not have to pay the
penalty if all of the shareholders treated their shares of corporate profits as a
dividend.252  Subsequent distributions of amounts that were previously taxed to
the shareholder under this rule were expressly exempt from the shareholder’s
normal tax and any surtax.253
As a result of this rule, the corporation’s undistributed profits would be
subject to the shareholder’s normal tax and surtax.  Meanwhile, the corpora-
tion’s distributed profits would be subject to the corporate tax and the share-
holder’s surtax.  By contrast, all partnership profits, whether distributed or not,
were subject to the partner’s normal tax and surtax.  There was one other differ-
ence.  Certain items of a partnership retained their quality and character in the
hands of the partners.254  By contrast, the profits of a corporation were treated
as a dividend.255  The combined effect of these changes likely had no material
effect on the incentive to use the corporate form as a vehicle for reducing taxes.
The 13.5% tax on undistributed corporate profits was still substantially lower
than the 33.5% maximum combined tax on distributed corporate profits and the
25% maximum combined tax on partnership profits.
249 Id. § 218(a), 44 Stat. at 32.
250 Id. § 216(a), 44 Stat. at 29.
251 Id. § 220(a), 44 Stat. at 34.
252 Id. § 220(e), 44 Stat. at 34-35.
253 Id.  Interestingly, this provision was added to the bill by the Senate Finance Committee,
which in 1924 removed a similar measure from the revenue bill.  Under that rejected mea-
sure, if the Commissioner of Internal Revenue concluded that a corporation had been availed
of in order to evade the individual surtax, the shareholders could have elected (with the
Commissioner’s consent) to be taxed on their respective shares of the corporation’s net
income for the year. See text accompanying notes 238-41.  Such an election would have
been a substitute for the corporate penalty tax.
254 Id. § 218(b), 44 Stat. at 32.
255 This foreshadows the way the rules of subchapter S operated when they were first
adopted.  Under those rules, the profits of the corporation were taxed to the shareholders on a
pro rata basis as a dividend. See I.R.C. § 1373(b) (1958).
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1928
With the passage of the Revenue Act of 1928, Congress neither revised
the basic structure, nor adjusted the rates for the normal tax and the surtax.256
It did, however, reduce the corporate tax to12%, down from 13.5% under
existing law.257  This incremental change probably did not have a material
effect on the incentives for a corporation to retain profits instead of distributing
them to shareholders.  Congress continued to rely on the accumulated earnings
penalty tax to discourage the illegitimate retention of corporate profits.258
Those provisions did not change.259  However, Congress made a concerted
effort to put more teeth into the law.
The effort began in the House Committee of Ways and Means.  The origi-
nal bill reported out of that Committee divided the existing provision into two
parts.260  First, it retained the original rule that imposed a penalty tax on any
corporation that accumulated profits in order to avoid the surtax on individual
incomes.261  The committee reduced the penalty tax from 50% to 25% on the
theory that the lower rate would eliminate unnecessarily harsh features of the
tax and help enhance its practical effectiveness.262
The second part of the bill included a provision directed at so-called per-
sonal holding companies.263  The provision defined a personal holding com-
pany by reference to the corporation’s concentration of ownership.
Specifically, a personal holding company was any corporation where ten or
fewer individuals directly or indirectly owned at least 80% of the vote or
value.264  The Committee members believed that this class of corporations was
more likely than other corporations to accumulate surplus in order to evade
256 As under prior law, a 1.5% tax applied to the first $4,000 of net income above an exempt
amount, a 3% tax applied to the next $4,000 of net income, and a 5% tax applied to all
remaining net income.  Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 11, 45 Stat. 791, 795.  The personal
exemption remained unchanged at $1,500 for a single person and at $3,500 for a married
couple or the head of a family. Id. § 25(c), 45 Stat. at 803.  The exemption for dependents
also remained unchanged at $400 for each dependent. Id. § 25(d), 45 Stat. at 803.  The
surtax continued to have 20 separate brackets with rates ranging from 1% to 20%. Id.
§ 12(a), 45 Stat. at 796.  Any partner of a partnership had to pay normal tax and surtax on his
share of any partnership profits, whether distributed to him or not. Id. § 182(a), 45 Stat. at
840.  Meanwhile, dividends were subject to the surtax, but they were exempt from the nor-
mal tax. Id. § 25(a)(1), 45 Stat. at 802.
257 Id. § 13(a), 45 Stat. at 797.  The Act increased the statutory exclusion that was available
to corporations.  A corporation was generally allowed to reduced its net income by $3,000
(up from $2,000) for purposes of computing its income tax liability. Id. § 26(b), 45 Stat. at
803.
258 Id. § 104, 45 Stat. at 814-15.
259 As under prior law, if a corporation accumulated profits in order to prevent the share-
holder level surtax from coming into play, the corporation was subject to a penalty tax equal
to 50% of its net income, in addition to the corporate tax. Id. § 104(a), 45 Stat. at 814.
However, as under prior law, the penalty tax would never apply to a corporation in any year
that all of the shareholders included in income as a dividend their shares of the corporation’s
net income for the year. Id. § 104(d), 45 Stat. at 815.
260 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 17-18 (1927).
261 Id.
262 Id. at 18.
263 Id. at 17.
264 Id.
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individual surtaxes on corporate earnings.265  Moreover, during House floor
debates, one lawmaker suggested that it may not be proper to respect the corpo-
ration as being separate and distinct from its owner when such a concentration
of ownership exists.266
Any corporation qualifying as a personal holding company would be sub-
ject to a 25% tax on a certain portion of its undistributed profits.  The taxable
portion consisted of the amount that exceeded the firm’s net income in addition
to any dividends it paid plus any tax-free interest it received.267  The Senate
believed it was time for a new approach to the taxation of undistributed profits
partly because the Treasury Department was not enforcing the existing rules.268
Opponents to the new rule cited two related problems.  First was the fact
that the new rule would impose a higher tax on undistributed profits than on
distributed profits.  According to Representative William R. Green, there would
be “a differential of 20 per cent between profits distributed and those which
were not.”269   The second problem with the new set of rules was that it did not
distinguish between companies that had legitimate reasons for accumulating its
earnings and those that did not.  Representative Green of Iowa expressed the
situation in these words:
This provision proposed by the advisory committee, which was not approved by the
joint committee, and approved by the gentleman from Texas, would penalize those
gentlemen who are honestly endeavoring to build up a surplus which they needed in
their business, and without which they could not make a success of their business,
and they are hit as hard or harder than those trying to avoid the tax.270
The personal holding company rules were rejected by the Senate Finance
Committee, which amended the bill in conformity with existing law.271  The
Committee described the definition of a personal holding company as an “arbi-
trary” one that would effectively penalize corporations that were properly
accumulating a surplus and failed to recognize business necessities and sound
practices.272  In addition, the Committee believed that the need for such a pro-
vision was declining as the disparity between the individual and corporate tax
265 Id.
266 69 CONG. REC. 521 (1927) (statement of Rep. Green).  In the words of Rep. William R.
Green of Iowa, “As I said before, in nearly all of these cases there was one person who really
got the benefit of all the profits of the company, but escaped the surtax by reason of the
corporation.” Id.
267 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 17.
268 Representative Garner of Texas put it this way:
[The existing rule] was intended to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to force corporations to
distribute their profits and subject their shareholders to the tax levied by Congress.  It has been in
the statute for some years.
The advisory committee, in a very delicate way, intimated that the Treasury Department has
not enforced the law. . . .
. . . .
Now the committee . . .  has in good faith undertaken to draw a provision that will be
mandatory on the Treasury Department.
69 CONG. REC. 519 (1927) (statement of Rep. Garner).
269 Id. at 520 (statement of Rep. Green).
270 Id.
271 S. REP. NO. 70-960, at 1-2 (1928).
272 Id. at 12.
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rates was decreasing.273  Finally, the Committee believed that changes made in
1924 and 1926 made the provision easier to administer and had begun to result
in it being applied in greater numbers of cases.274
Those who commented on the proposal during the floor debates expressed
discomfort with the use of a rigid rule to address situations that required more
flexibility.  Senator William H. King viewed the government’s predicament this
way:
In dealing with questions of this character, as well as many others in revenue mea-
sures, the legislative branch of the Government has difficulty in steering between
Charybdis and Scylla.  If there are too many limitations in statutes, difficulties arise.
It is impossible to foresee all the complications and conditions that will arise. . . .
. . . .
I am not satisfied with this section, and yet I am not in [a] position to offer an
amendment to supersede it.  The Finance Committee considered the House amend-
ment, which was intended to clarify the situation; and I think that after due considera-
tion the committee reached the conclusion that instead of clarification it would add to
the uncertainty and dubiety if attempts were made to prescribe the limitation upon the
amount allowed as reserves and the circumstances under which such reserves should
be set up.275
Senator Furnifold M. Simmons expressed similar sentiments:
In all of our discussions about this question, however, we have all realized the
fact that sound economy in the conduct of a business by a corporation made it neces-
sary that they should set aside a certain part of their annual earnings for purposes of
enlargement, for purposes of improvement of their methods and their equipment, and
that the requirements of one class of corporations in this respect were different from
those of another class of corporations; that it was almost impossible to lay down any
fixed rule to regulate the distribution of these accumulated surpluses which would not
be to the disadvantage of some and to the advantage of other corporations.  In that
state of inability to adjust what the several corporations of the country might legiti-
mately and reasonably require in order to be upon a safe footing in the conduct of
their business, and to enlarge and develop their business and improve their methods,
we felt that we were hopeless unless the Secretary of the Treasury would enforce this
provision of the law.276
Although the personal holding company rules were not enacted in 1928,
the proposal inspired later attempts to pass similar versions of these rules in
1932 and (successfully) in 1934.277
1932
Congress increased all tax rates in 1932 and also restructured the normal
tax and the surtax rate tables.278  Starting in 1932, a two-tiered schedule of
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 69 CONG. REC. 7976-77 (1928) (statement of Sen. King).
276 Id. at 7977 (statement of Sen. Simmons).
277 See infra notes 290-91, 299-302 and accompanying text.
278 Joint Resolution Reducing Rates of Income Tax for the Calendar Year 1929, ch. 2, 46
Stat. 47.  In 1929, Congress adopted a joint resolution that temporarily reduced certain tax
rates for 1929 only. Id.  The three tiered normal income tax on individuals was revised
under this measure so that the first $4,000 of net income was taxed at .5% (down from
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rates replaced the three-tiered normal tax rate schedule.  A 4% tax applied to
the first $4,000 of net income above an exempt amount, while an 8% tax
applied to amounts above $4,000.279  Existing law imposed a maximum normal
tax of 5%.280  The surtax was also substantially restructured and revised.  The
number of tax brackets was increased from twenty to fifty-three, with a 55%
tax applying to net income in excess of one million dollars.281  The lowest
surtax was a 1% levy that applied to net income above $6,000 and up to
$10,000.282  The basic structure of the tax system remained the same.283  The
1932 Act increased the corporate income tax rate to 13.75% (compared to 12%
under prior law).284  The combination of these changes substantially increased
the incentive to accumulate earnings in a corporate shell as a way to avoid tax.
Undistributed corporate profits were subject to a 13.75% tax, while distributed
corporate profits were subject to a combined maximum tax of 68.75%.  Mean-
while, partnership profits were subject to a combined maximum tax of up to
63%.  Once again the need for an effective measure to curb potential abusive
practices was evident.
There were no changes to the accumulated earnings penalty tax provi-
sions.285  However, the House considered and rejected an amendment that
would have imposed a tax on a corporation’s accumulated surplus.286  Repre-
sentatives Fiorello LaGuardia and Thomas Blanton offered the rationale for the
amendment.  They focused on two practices employed by operating corpora-
tions to avoid the surtax on corporate profits.  First, they cited the practice of
piling up a surplus to avoid tax and to use the money for call money or even to
gamble in the stock market.287  Another practice was to pay dividends in stock,
not cash, solely to avoid the surtax.288
The lawmakers resurrected a modified version of the personal holding
company tax to address the abuses.  Under the proposal, offered by Representa-
tive LaGuardia, a personal holding company was defined as any holding or
1.5%), the second $4,000 was taxed at 2% (down from 3%), and net income above $8,000
was taxed at 4% (down from 5%). Id.  In addition, the corporate income tax was lowered to
11% (compared to 12%). Id.  There was no change to the individual surtax. See id.
279 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 11, 47 Stat. 169, 174.  The personal exemptions were
reduced.  A single person was allowed a $1,000 personal exemption for purposes of the
normal tax only, while a married couple or the head of a family was allowed a $2,500
personal exemption (compared to $3,500 under prior law). Id. § 25(c), 47 Stat. at 184.  The
exemption for dependents remained at $400. Id. § 25(d), 47 Stat. at 184.
280 Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 11, 45 Stat. 791, 795.
281 Revenue Act of 1932 § 12(a), 47 Stat. 174-77.
282 Id. § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174.
283 Partners continued to be taxed on their share of partnership income for the year. Id.
§ 182(a), 47 Stat. at 222.  Dividends continued to be exempt from the individual normal tax,
but not the surtax. Id. § 25(a)(1), 47 Stat. at 184.
284 Id. § 13(a), 47 Stat. at 177.  Unlike prior law which included a $3,000 statutory exemp-
tion to corporations, no such statutory exemption was available to corporations under the
1932 Act.
285 See id. § 104, 47 Stat. at 195.
286 Under the amendment, a 25% tax on net income would apply to any personal holding
company that permitted more than 30% of its net income to accumulate.  75 CONG. REC.
6978 (1932).
287 75 CONG. REC. 6477 (1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
288 Id. at 6478 (statement of Rep. Frear).
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investment company that satisfied two conditions.  First, at least 80% of its
voting stock was owned or controlled directly or indirectly by not more than
fifty individuals.289  Second, at least 80% of its gross income for the year was
derived from rents, royalties, dividends, interest (excluding tax-exempt inter-
est), and (except in the case of regular dealers in securities) gain from the sale
of securities or other assets producing such income.290  This definition was
substantially similar to the one that appeared in the personal holding company
proposal included in the 1928 revenue bill reported out of the House Commit-
tee, with one material difference.  Under the 1928 House Committee proposal,
the stock ownership test was met if ten or fewer individuals owned 80% of the
voting stock or had a right to receive 80% of the value.291  By contrast, the
LaGuardia proposal capped the number of shareholders at fifty, which would
cover more cases.
1934
The Revenue Act of 1934 restructured and revised both the normal tax and
the surtax on individuals.  The legislation imposed a normal tax of 4% on an
individual’s net income.292  Under prior law the normal tax had two brackets,
with an 8% tax applying in the top bracket.  The revised surtax consisted of
twenty-nine separate rate brackets, ranging from 4% to 59%.293  The normal
tax and the surtax still applied to any individual’s share of partnership profits,
whether received or not.294  Dividends remained exempt from the normal tax,
but not the surtax.295  The corporate tax remained at 13.75% of net income.296
The 1934 Act revised the accumulated earnings penalty tax.  Under the
new rules, any corporation found to have illegitimately accumulated its profits
had to pay a 25% surtax on the first $100,000 of undistributed earnings for the
year, and a 35% surtax on any amount in excess of $100,000.297  Under prior
law, the corporation was subject to a 50% penalty tax.  As under prior law, a
corporation would be relieved of its obligation to pay the penalty if all of the
shareholders included in net income as a dividend their share of the corpora-
tion’s net income for the year.298
289 Id. at 6978.
290 Id.
291 H.R. REP. NO. 70-2, at 17 (1927).
292 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277 § 11, 48 Stat. 680, 684.  The personal exemptions
remained unchanged.  A single person was entitled to exclude $1,000 from net income for
purposes of computing his normal tax liability, while married couples and the head of a
family was entitled to exclude $2,500 for this purpose. Id. § 25(b)(1), 48 Stat. at 693.  The
exemption for dependents remained at $400 for each dependent. Id. § 25(b)(2), 48 Stat. at
693.
293 Id. § 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86.  The 4% tax applied to net income over $4,000 and up to
$6,000, while the 59% tax applied to net income in excess of $1 million. Id. § 12(b), 48
Stat. at 684, 686.
294 Id. § 182, 48 Stat. at 730.
295 Id. § 25(a)(1), 48 Stat. at 692.
296 Id. § 13(a), 48 Stat. at 686.
297 Id. § 102(a), 48 Stat. at 702.
298 Id. § 102(d), 48 Stat. at 702.
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The legislation introduced a new set of rules directed at the use of the
corporation to achieve tax savings.  Under the personal holding company provi-
sions, the corporation had to pay a 30% surtax on the first $100,000 of any
undistributed net income, and a 40% surtax on any undistributed amounts in
excess of $100,000.299  A corporation qualified as a personal holding company
if it was not a bank and if it satisfied a gross income test and an ownership test.
A corporation passed the gross income test if at least 80% of its gross income
for the year consisted of certain passive items of income, like interest and divi-
dends.300  A corporation passed the ownership test if five or fewer individuals
owned (directly or indirectly) over 50% of the value of the corporation at any
time during the last half of the year.301  As with the accumulated earnings pen-
alty tax, a corporation would have no exposure to the personal holding com-
pany tax whenever all of the shareholders included in net income as a dividend
their share of the corporation’s net income for the year.302
The personal holding company rules were adopted after several years of
Congressional attention to the subject of tax avoidance.  The examination for-
mally dates back to June 9, 1933, when a subcommittee of the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means was appointed to investigate methods of preventing the
evasion and avoidance of the tax laws.303  The recommendations included a
provision addressing so-called personal holding companies.  The Subcommittee
described the classic personal holding company technique as follows:
Perhaps the most prevalent form of tax avoidance practiced by individuals with large
incomes is the scheme of the “incorporated pocketbook.”  That is, an individual
forms a corporation and exchanges for its stock his personal holdings in stock, bonds,
or other income-producing property.  By this means the income from the property
pays corporation tax, but no surtax is paid by the individual if the income is not
distributed.304
In order to address this situation, the Subcommittee recommended divid-
ing the existing accumulated earnings penalty tax provisions into two parts.305
The idea was to preserve the existing rule in one section while providing a
special rule for personal holding companies in a second section.  This special
rule contained two principal parts.  The first part defined a personal holding
company.306  The second part imposed a tax on a portion of the undistributed
earnings of any corporation that qualified as a personal holding company.307
299 Id. § 351(a), 48 Stat. at 751.  The accumulated penalty tax would not apply to any cor-
poration that had to pay the personal holding company tax. Id. § 102(a), 48 Stat. at 702.
300 Id. § 351(b)(1)(A), 48 Stat. at 751.
301 Id. § 351(b)(1)(B), 48 Stat. at 751.  Attribution rules applied to determine stock owner-
ship. Id. § 351(b)(1)(C)-(E), 48 Stat. at 751-52.
302 Id. § 351(d), 48 Stat. at 752.  The shareholders would not be taxed on the receipt of any
earnings that were previously taxed to them under this rule. Id.
303 H.R. Res. 183, 73d Cong. (1933).
304 STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73D CONG., 2D SESS., PREVENTION OF
TAX AVOIDANCE:  HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS RELATIVE TO
METHODS OF PREVENTING THE AVOIDANCE AND EVASION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS
TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR THE SIMPLIFICATION AND IMPROVEMENT THEREOF 6
(Comm. Print 1933) [hereinafter PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE].
305 Id. at 7.
306 Id.
307 Id.
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Under the special rule, a personal holding company was defined to be any
corporation that satisfied an ownership test and a gross income test.  The own-
ership test would be met if over 50% of the voting stock was owned by five or
fewer individuals at the close of the taxable year.308  The gross income test
would be met if at least 80% of the company’s gross income came from rents,
royalties, dividends, interest, annuities, and gains from the sale of securities.309
When these conditions were met in any year, the corporation would have to pay
a 35% personal holding company tax.310  The tax applied to an amount referred
to as undistributed adjusted net income.  This figure was arrived at by first
taking the corporation’s net income increased by dividends received from other
corporations and any partially tax-exempt interest, and reduced by federal
income taxes, excluded contributions and gifts, and disallowed capital
losses.311  The result, referred to as adjusted net income, was further reduced
by a 10% allowance and any dividends actually paid to stockholders during the
year to arrive at undistributed adjusted net income.312
The 35% personal holding company tax stood in contrast to a 25% tax on
corporations that improperly accumulated surplus.  The Subcommittee recom-
mended a 25% tax in place of the existing 50% levy on the theory that the 50%
tax was “too high to be readily enforceable.”313
Perhaps because the Subcommittee framed the personal holding company
rules as a subset of the original rules directed at tax avoidance, the proposed
rules were viewed through the lens of tax avoidance and evasion.  However,
later hearings suggest that a majority of the Subcommittee viewed the rules as a
way to establish tax parity between incorporated and unincorporated
businesses.314
The administration’s official reaction to the personal holding company
proposal was not enthusiastic.  The Treasury Department agreed with the Sub-
committee’s plan to subject the undistributed income of personal holding com-
panies to a higher rate of tax than that of other corporations.315  However, the
Department thought that by defining a personal holding company with such
detail, the rule would be both overinclusive and underinclusive, applying to
corporations that legitimately accumulated surplus as well as failing to cover all
corporations that were improperly accumulating surpluses.316
Those concerns were echoed in the statements made by individuals who
appeared before the full House Committee on Ways and Means during the
hearings on the 1934 Act.  In his prepared statement to the Committee, F.H.
Clausen, Chairman of the Committee on Federal Taxation of the United States
Chamber of Commerce made this observation:  “It is believed, however, that
the method proposed by the sub-committee of the Ways and Means Committee
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 8.
314 See infra notes 317-22 and accompanying text.
315 PREVENTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, supra note 304, at 8.
316 Id.
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for dealing with this matter is inequitable because it would unjustly penalize
innocent individuals and legitimate business enterprises falling within the pro-
posed definition of a personal holding company.”317
The members of the Subcommittee revealed their interest in establishing
tax parity between incorporated and unincorporated businesses during the
appearance of Harry J. Gerrity, who represented the National Association of
Building Owners and Managers.  Mr. Gerrity made the point that under the
proposed definition of personal holding company, any company whose sole
purpose was to own and manage real estate would qualify and be required to
pay the 35% tax on undistributed earnings in excess of the 10% allowance.318
Four members of the seven member Subcommittee questioned him in an
attempt to understand why earnings from a real estate business should be
exempt from the surtax solely because it is incorporated, while an unincorpo-
rated business would remain subject to tax on its earnings.319  The exchange
between Mr. Gerrity and Representative Samuel B. Hill, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee, went this way:
Mr. Hill.  In case it is an individual instead of a corporation that is managing these
office buildings, the individual has to pay his tax, and if it gets up into the surtax
bracket, he has to pay the tax according to the bracket in which he finds himself.
That is true, isn’t it?
Mr. Gerrity.  That is true.
Mr. Hill.  Now why should a corporation be utilized for the purpose of avoiding that
payment of tax of the individual, and that is what it amounts to.  You would incorpo-
rate for bookkeeping and let this corporation handle the matter instead of handling it
individually.  That is the class of individuals we are trying to reach, and it seems to
fit your case pretty closely.
Mr. Gerrity.  We are not in that class.  You build an office building and invariably it
is built by a corporation and you may own all of the stock of it.
Mr. Hill.  You don’t have to own all of it, you could build it without being a
corporation.
Mr. Gerrity.  That is true, but corporations have grown up.
Mr. Hill.  I know they have, but why use the corporate agency instead of acting as an
individual–simply because of certain advantages that come through the corporation.
Mr. Gerrity.  Yes; but not for the purpose of avoiding taxes.
Mr. Hill.  But it does operate in that direction.
. . . .
If the stock is owned by one person or controlled by one person he might or
might not declare dividends as it might be of advantage to him in a taxpaying way,
and that is what the subcommittee had in mind, to put these people on the same basis
with individuals who are operating office buildings or other similar institutions, who
have to pay their taxes.  Yet through the agency of a corporation in such a case as
you have described here, this particular character of investments has escaped the tax
that individuals operating in a similar way have to pay.320
317 Revenue Revision, 1934:  Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 73d Cong.
293 (1934) (statement of F.H. Clausen).
318 Id. at 296-97 (statement of Rep. Gerrity).
319 Those four members were Representatives Hill, Cooper, Treadway and Vinson. Id. at
296-99.  The other three members were Representatives Cullen, Crowther, and Frear.
320 Id. at 297-98.
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An exchange between Mr. Gerrity and Representative Jare Cooper simi-
larly revealed how the Subcommittee was at least partially concerned about
establishing tax parity between incorporated and unincorporated businesses:
Mr. Cooper.  Talking about the deficits of the last few years, you don’t have to pay
taxes when you have deficits?
Mr. Gerrity.  That is true, but we are paying local taxes, and there is no return in the
office buildings today.
Mr. Cooper.  And everybody else is paying local, county, municipal, and State taxes;
and, of course, many of them have deficits just as you have.
Mr. Gerrity.  Yes.321
The third and fourth Subcommittee members to reveal a concern about
establishing tax parity were Representatives Treadway and Vinson, who had
this exchange with Mr. Gerrity:
Mr. Treadway.  One person building a store building–and you have mentioned one
person several times in your testimony–now, why shouldn’t that one person, if he is
going to own all of the stock, go ahead and build it on his own; why form himself
into a corporation unless there is some advantage to it somewhere?
Mr. Gerrity.  Of course in the local laws there is an advantage in the corporate form;
he might also own an apartment which he has in the name of a corporation, and also
own two or three other office buildings in the same neighborhood, and he wants to
keep them all running separately and not keep them together.
Mr. Vinson.  And thereby not get into the upper brackets, if you have an income.
Mr. Gerrity.  I don’t think that is the purpose.
Mr. Treadway.  I don’t think your explanation covers it.
Mr. Gerrity.  It is just good business.
Mr. Treadway.  Of course it is good business.
Mr. Gerrity.  It is for the limitation of liability, and the individual might have the
question of loans and all that sort of thing.  In other words, he keeps the operation of
this building separate and distinct from a lot of his other activities, which is quite
proper for business purposes.322
The full House Committee on Ways and Means adopted the Subcommit-
tee’s personal holding company rules without amendment.  In doing so, the
Committee described it as a measure that would “provide for a tax [that would]
be automatically levied upon the holding company without any necessity for
providing a purpose of avoiding surtaxes.”323  In the opinion of the Committee,
“the majority of such corporations [were] in fact formed for the sole purpose of
avoiding the imposition of the surtax upon the stockholders.”324
Congress made several material modifications to the legislation before it
was eventually enacted into law.  Many of the changes were designed to
exclude real estate corporations from the scope of the new rules.  In order to
accomplish this goal, the Senate Finance Committee removed “rents” from the
list of incomes that would count toward meeting the 80% passive income
test.325  Committee members offered a variety of reasons for the amendment.
According to the Senate Committee Report, “A great part of real-estate busi-
321 Id. at 298.
322 Id. at 298-99.
323 H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 554, 563.
324 Id.
325 S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 14 (1934), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 554, 596-97.
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ness is done by small family corporations” that are more in the nature of operat-
ing companies, not personal holding companies.326  Other individual
lawmakers shared the view that the real estate business was unique in ways that
required excluding such companies from the scope of the new rules.  Represen-
tative Thomas A. Jenkins explained during House floor debates that distribut-
ing profits to shareholders might be inconvenient to real estate companies when
they needed the funds to cover repairs on the property.327  After the House
conceded to the Senate amendment, Representative Hill pointed out that the
Conferees “thought [it would be] unfair to compel real-estate companies with
heavy mortgage indebtedness to distribute earnings accumulated to meet [such
obligations].”328
Another significant modification was that the allowable reserve was
increased from 10% to 20%.329  This amendment was offered in order to pre-
vent the tax from applying to family corporations that legitimately set aside a
reserve for future investment in the business.330  The amendment was included
in the final legislation.331
Existing law relieved a corporation from having to pay the accumulated
earnings penalty tax if each shareholder included in gross income his pro rata
share of the corporation’s net income.332  An identical option was proposed to
be made available in the case of personal holding companies.333  The provision
was included in the legislation as a result of an amendment made on the floor
of the Senate.334  The provision was criticized for permitting shareholders to
avoid the personal holding company tax.  Senator James Couzens expressed his
views in these terms:
Mr. President, I want to point out that this is one of the most extraordinary amend-
ments that I have ever seen offered.  It is offered with the intent of permitting evasion
by holding companies of the safeguarding provisions which the committee wrote into
the bill.  In other words, it permits a stockholder of a corporation to report falsely an
income which he has not received.335
However, the sponsors justified the measure on two grounds.  First, they
noted how it accommodated the peculiar situation of stockholders of companies
that might have had foreign investments.336  This provision permitted the
United States tax to be paid without triggering a liability for any foreign tax.337
Members of Congress consistently recognized that a distribution of corporate
326 Id. 
327 78 CONG. REC. 2619 (1934) (statement of Rep. Jenkins).
328 78 CONG. REC. 7831 (1934) (statement of Rep. Hill).
329 78 CONG. REC. 6240 (1934) (statement of Rep. King).
330 Id.
331 H.R. REP. NO. 73-1385, at 20 (1934).
332 See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 104(d), 47 Stat. 169, 195.
333 See H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., § 351 (as passed by Senate, March 28, 1934).  Neither the
House nor the Senate Finance Committee included such a provision in the legislation. See
H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., § 102 (Comm. Print, Feb. 20, 1934) and H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., § 351
(as reported by S. Comm. on Finance, March 28, 1934).
334 See H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., § 351 (as passed by Senate, March 28, 1934).
335 78 CONG. REC. 6307 (1934) (statement of Sen. Couzens).
336 Id. (statement of Sen. Reed).
337 Id. 
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earnings was one way to avoid the tax.338  In addition, the sponsors explained
that the provision was entirely consistent with the overall goal of preventing tax
avoidance through the use of the incorporated pocketbook.339  Because stock-
holders would be paying surtax on the corporation’s accumulated surplus, the
tax would not be avoided.340
The Senate Finance Committee separated the accumulated earnings tax
rules from the new personal holding company rules, moving the latter to a new
title of the Revenue Act called Additional Income Taxes.341  In addition, the
Committee modified the structure of the tax itself.  It replaced the flat 35% tax
with a two-tiered graduated surtax.  Under the Senate Bill, a 30% tax applied to
the first $100,000 of undistributed adjusted net income and a 40% tax on the
corporation’s undistributed adjusted net income in excess of $100,000.342  By
contrast, the accumulated earnings provisions of the Finance Committee bill
imposed a 25% tax on the first $100,000 of adjusted net income and a 35% tax
on adjusted net income in excess of $100,000.343  Both amendments were
included into the 1934 Revenue Act that was signed into law.
The personal holding company rules represent a milestone in the struggle
by Congress to deal with the incentives to evade tax produced by the disparities
in the taxation of business profits.  Until 1934, Congress had either not consid-
ered or resisted the urge to define with precision the instances in which a corpo-
ration would be denied the partial tax relief that was otherwise available for
undistributed corporate profits.  However, the nation’s abysmal experience with
the accumulated earnings tax appeared to push lawmakers to consider a differ-
ent approach.  During the two decades that it was in effect, the accumulated
earnings tax had very little impact.344  Its vague standards left too much room
for taxpayers to evade tax and placed too heavy a burden on the government to
chase them down.345  The personal holding company provisions, with their well
defined rules, marked the end of one era and the beginning of another in the
338 E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 73-704, at 12 (1934).
339 78 CONG. REC. 6326 (1934) (statement of Sen. Reed).
340 Id.
341 S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 44 (1934), reprinted in1939-1 (part 2) C.B. 554, 596.
342 Id.
343 H.R. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 102 (Comm. Print, Feb. 20, 1934).
344 By 1934 there were five reported cases where the government attempted to assess the
accumulated earnings tax, and the governments success rate was less than stellar.  The gov-
ernment prevailed in two of the five cases.  Williams Inv. Co. v. U.S., 3 F. Supp. 225 (Ct. Cl.
1933) (government assesses tax for 1924 through 1926; court upholds imposition of tax for
all three years; corporation was wholly owned by one individual); Keck Inv. Co. v. Comm’r,
29 B.T.A. 143 (1933) (government assesses tax for 1923; board upholds the assessment;
corporation was wholly owned by a married couple).  It lost one case.  R.C. Tway Coal Sales
Co. v. United States, 3 F. Supp. 668 (W.D. Ky. 1933) (government assesses tax for 1922 and
1923; court rejects the assessment; one individual owned a majority of shares while other
stockholders held substantial stock interests too).  The government scored a partial victory in
the other two.  William C. DeMille Prods,, Inc., v. Comm’r, 30 B.T.A. 826 (1934) (govern-
ment assesses tax for 1924 through 1928; board upholds imposition of tax for 1924 and
1925; corporation was 99.6% owned by one individual); United Bus. Corp. of Am., 19
B.T.A. 809 (1930) (government assesses tax for 1920 and 1921; court upholds imposition of
tax for 1921 only; corporation was wholly owned by one individual), aff’d, 62 F.2d 754 (2d
Cir. 1933).
345 See supra notes 204, 242-43, and 268 and accompanying text.
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nation’s efforts to reconcile its desire to collect tax under a progressive system
while simultaneously allowing business profits to be taxed in two drastically
different ways.
CONCLUSION
The drafters of our nineteenth century tax laws adopted two different
methods for taxing business profits.  By and large, the use of two methods did
not signify that one type of business deserved to be treated differently for tax
purposes than another.  To the contrary, the design of the system and other
evidence suggest that Congress decided to collect tax at the entity level on
certain businesses primarily because it was more efficient and reliable.  Indeed,
there was a concerted, and largely successful, attempt to prevent the two tax
collection methods from producing disparate results.  The task of preventing or
eliminating disparities was not an overwhelming one during the nineteenth cen-
tury when the progressive tax system had a relatively crude design, consisting
of no more than two rates.
The situation changed considerably in the twentieth century.  Congress
was under growing pressure to allocate the tax burden in a more equitable way
so that wealthier individuals would assume a greater share of the tax burden.  In
addition, the country’s involvement in World War I created a need to raise
more revenue.  This led Congress to restructure the way individuals computed
their tax liability so that there were more rate brackets, a wider range of rates,
and increasingly higher rates that applied to individuals with the largest
incomes.
At the same time, Congress began to utilize two different procedures for
taxing business profits, depending on whether the firm was incorporated or not.
The profits of a corporation enjoyed partial tax relief if they were not distrib-
uted to shareholders.  However, any distributed corporate profits and any prof-
its of a partnership or other unincorporated business were taxed in full.  The
disparity between the tax on undistributed corporate profits and the maximum
combined tax on other forms of business profits was substantial at times and
operated on three different levels that are summarized in the tables and charts
in the Appendix.  First, undistributed corporate profits enjoyed a huge tax
advantage over undistributed partnership profits.346  Second, distributed part-
nership profits enjoyed a slight tax advantage over distributed corporate prof-
its.347  Third, undistributed corporate profits enjoyed a huge tax advantage over
distributed corporate profits.348  All of these factors created an incentive to
house investments and other income producing activities in a corporate shell
and to allow the earnings to accumulate in order to prevent that income from
being subject to the higher taxes that would otherwise come into play.
Congress provided undistributed corporate profits with partial tax relief on
the theory that the firm would later invest these amounts in the business.  How-
ever, there was no assurance that a corporation’s undistributed profits would
actually be used in that way.  Thus, it was virtually impossible to know whether
346 See infra pp. 176 (Table 1), 178 (Chart 1).
347 See infra pp. 179 (Table 2), 181 (Chart 2).
348 See infra pp. 182 (Table 3), 184 (Chart 3).
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the earnings retained by a corporation were legitimately entitled to the tax relief
or not.  Understandably, Congress foresaw the need to address the potential for
tax evasion.  However, the accumulated earnings tax proved to be an ineffec-
tive device for curbing and penalizing abusive practices.  As a result, there
were countless cases where business profits that were not entitled to partial tax
relief in fact received it.
The government’s inability to curb or penalize abusive practices means
that there were likely widespread cases of individuals whose ability to pay tax
was either disguised or otherwise understated.  This has a number of trouble-
some implications.  First, it means that individuals who appeared to have the
same ability to pay (based on whatever measure the tax system employed) in
fact did not.  Instead, the successful tax evader had a greater ability to pay than
he appeared to have.  Second, it means that individuals who appeared to have a
different ability to pay tax could have had the same ability to pay.  That would
be the case when one compares the tax avoider with his counterpart whose
income was not understated as a result of tax avoidance.  Third, it means that
the system that was designed to operate on the basis of ability to pay may have
failed to do so in practice.  To that extent it appears that Congress may have
failed to achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden, thereby preventing
the tax from operating in a fair way.  What’s more, the system seemed to pro-
duce these inequitable outcomes with greater frequency whenever Congress
attempted to make the tax rates more progressive.  Paradoxically, the federal
income tax may have actually operated in a less equitable way whenever Con-
gress attempted to fortify its progressive qualities.  It is a legacy of the corpo-
rate tax that vexes tax policymakers to this day.
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TABLE 1*
Tax on Profits Retained by a Firm
Profits Retained by Profits Retained by
a Corporation a Partnership
Top Top
Corp. Other Total Normal Top Total
Year Tax Tax Tax Tax Surtax Tax
1913 1% 1.00% 1% 6% 7.00%
1914 1% 1.00% 1% 6% 7.00%
1915 1% 1.00% 1% 6% 7.00%
1916 2% 2.00% 2% 13% 15.00%
1917 6%a 10%b 16.00%c 4%d 63%e 67.00%f
1918 12% 12.00%g 12% 65% 77.00%
1919 10% 10.00%h 8% 65% 73.00%
* Source:  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913-1915 corporate
tax), § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-1915 normal tax), § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-
1915 surtax); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765 (1916-1917 corporate
tax), § 1(a), 39 Stat. at 756 (1916-1917 normal tax), § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 757 (1916-1917
surtax); War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917 corporate tax), § 1206(2), 40
Stat. at 334 (1917 tax on undistributed corporate profits), § 1, 40 Stat. at 300-01 (1917
normal tax), § 2, 40 Stat. at 301 (1917 surtax); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 230(a)(1), 40
Stat. 1057, 1076 (1918-1920 corporate tax), § 210(a), 40 Stat. at 1062 (1918-1920 normal
tax), § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64 (1918-1920 surtax); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230,
42 Stat. 227, 252 (1921-1923 corporate tax), § 210, 42 Stat. at 233 (1921-1923 normal tax),
§ 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37 (1921-1923 surtax); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43
Stat. 253, 282 (1924 corporate tax), § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264 (1924 normal tax), § 1200, 43
Stat. at 353 (1924 surtax); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 230(a)(1)-(2), 44 Stat. 9, 39
(1925-1927 corporate tax), § 210(a), 44 Stat. at 21 (1925-1927 normal tax), § 211(a), 44
Stat. at 22-23 (1925-1927 surtax); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 13(a), 45 Stat. 791, 797
(1928-1931 corporate tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1928-1931 normal tax), § 12(a), 45 Stat. at
796 (1928-1931 surtax); Joint Resolution Reducing Rates of Income Tax for the Calendar
Year 1929, ch. 2, 46. Stat. 47, 47 (1929 corporate tax and normal tax); Revenue Act of 1932,
ch. 209, § 13(a), 47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932-1933 corporate tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1932-
1933 normal tax), § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174-77 (1932-1933 surtax); Revenue Act of 1934, ch.
277, § 13(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686 (1934 corporate tax), § 11, 48 Stat. at 684 (1934 normal tax),
§ 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86 (1934 surtax).
Notes for Table 1:
a Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
b Temporary tax on undistributed corporate profits.
c Does not reflect the impact of the war-excess profits tax, which was imposed on all
taxpayers.
d Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
e Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
f Does not reflect the impact of the war-excess profits tax, which was imposed on all
taxpayers.
g Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
h Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
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Tax on Profits Retained by a Firm
Profits Retained by Profits Retained by
a Corporation a Partnership
Top Top
Corp. Other Total Normal Top Total
Year Tax Tax Tax Tax Surtax Tax
1920 10% 10.00%i 8% 65% 73.00%
1921 12.5% 12.50%j 8% 65% 73.00%
1922 12.5% 12.50% 8% 50% 58.00%
1923 12.5% 12.50% 8% 50% 58.00%k
1924 12.5% 12.50% 6% 40% 46.00%
1925 13% 13.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1926 13.50% 13.50% 5% 20% 25.00%
1927 13.50% 13.50% 5% 20% 25.00%
1928 12% 12.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1929 11% 11.00% 4% 20% 24.00%
1930 12% 12.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1931 12% 12.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1932 13.75% 13.75% 8% 55% 63.00%
1933 13.75% 13.75% 8% 55% 63.00%
1934 13.75% 13.75% 4% 59% 63.00%
i Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
j Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
k Does not reflect the impact of a 25% retroactive rebate of tax allowed to individuals in
1924 for 1923.
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CHART 1*
TAX ON PROFITS RETAINED BY A FIRM
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* Source:  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913-1915 corporate
tax), § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-1915 normal tax), § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-
1915 surtax); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765 (1916-1917 corporate
tax), § 1(a), 39 Stat. at 756 (1916-1917 normal tax), § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 757 (1916-1917
surtax); War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917 corporate tax), § 1206(2), 40
Stat. at 334 (1917 tax on undistributed corporate profits), § 1, 40 Stat. at 300-01 (1917
normal tax), § 2, 40 Stat. at 301 (1917 surtax); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 230(a)(1), 40
Stat. 1057, 1076 (1918-1920 corporate tax), § 210(a), 40 Stat. at 1062 (1918-1920 normal
tax), § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64 (1918-1920 surtax); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230,
42 Stat. 227, 252 (1921-1923 corporate tax), § 210, 42 Stat. at 233 (1921-1923 normal tax),
§ 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37 (1921-1923 surtax); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43
Stat. 253, 282 (1924 corporate tax), § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264 (1924 normal tax), § 1200, 43
Stat. at 353 (1924 surtax); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 230(a)(1)-(2), 44 Stat. 9, 39
(1925-1927 corporate tax), § 210(a), 44 Stat. at 21 (1925-1927 normal tax), § 211(a), 44
Stat. at 22-23 (1925-1927 surtax); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 13(a), 45 Stat. 791, 797
(1928-1931 corporate tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1928-1931 normal tax), § 12(a), 45 Stat. at
796 (1928-1931 surtax); Joint Resolution Reducing Rates of Income Tax for the Calendar
Year 1929, ch. 2, 46. Stat. 47, 47 (1929 corporate tax and normal tax); Revenue Act of 1932,
ch. 209, § 13(a), 47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932-1933 corporate tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1932-
1933 normal tax), § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174-77 (1932-1933 surtax); Revenue Act of 1934, ch.
277, § 13(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686 (1934 corporate tax), § 11, 48 Stat. at 684 (1934 normal tax),
§ 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86 (1934 surtax).
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TABLE 2*
Tax on Profits Distributed by a Firm
Distributed Corporate Distributed Partnership
Profits Profits
Top
Top Share- Top
Corp. holder Total Normal Top Total
Year Tax Tax Tax Tax Surtax Tax
1913 1% 6% 7.00% 1% 6% 7.00%
1914 1% 6% 7.00% 1% 6% 7.00%
1915 1% 6% 7.00% 1% 6% 7.00%
1916 2% 23% 15.00% 2% 13% 15.00%
1917 6%a 63%b 69.00%c 4%d 63%e 67.00%
1918 12% 65% 77.00%f 12% 65% 77.00%
1919 10% 65% 75.00%g 8% 65% 73.00%
1920 10% 65% 75.00%h 8% 65% 73.00%
* Source:  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913-1915 corporate
tax), § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-1915 normal tax), § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-
1915 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765 (1916-
1917 corporate tax), § 1(a), 39 Stat. at 756 (1916-1917 normal tax), § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 757
(1916-1917 surtax/shareholder tax); War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302
(1917 corporate tax), § 1206(2), 40 Stat. at 334 (1917 tax on undistributed corporate profits),
§ 1, 40 Stat. at 301 (1917 normal tax), § 2, 40 Stat. at 301 (1917 surtax/shareholder tax);
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (1918-1920 corporate tax),
§ 210(a), 40 Stat. at 1062 (1918-1920 normal tax), § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64 (1918-1910
surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252 (1921-1923
corporate tax), § 210, 42 Stat. at 233 (1921-1923 normal tax), § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37
(1921-1923 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282
(1924 corporate tax), § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264 (1924 normal tax), § 1200, 43 Stat. at 353
(1924 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 230(a)(1), (2), 44 Stat. 9, 39
(1925-1927 corporate tax), § 210(a), 44. Stat. at 21 (1925-1927 normal tax), § 211(a), 44
Stat. at 22-23 (1925-1927 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 13(a), 45
Stat. 791, 797 (1928-1931 corporate tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1928-1931 normal tax),
§ 12(a), 45 Stat. at 797 (1928-1931 surtax/shareholder tax); Joint Resolution Reducing Rates
of Income Tax for the Calendar Year 1929, ch. 2, 46 Stat. 47, 47 (1929 corporate tax and
normal tax); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 13(a), 47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932-1933 corporate
tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1932-1933 normal tax), § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174-77 (1932-1933
surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 13(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686 (1934
corporate tax), § 11, 48 Stat. at 684 (1934 normal tax), § 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86 (1934
surtax/shareholder tax).
Notes for Table 2:
a Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
b Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
c Does not reflect the impact of the war-excess profits tax, which was imposed on all
taxpayers.
d Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
e Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
f Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
g Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
h Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
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Tax on Profits Distributed by a Firm
Distributed Corporate Distributed Partnership
Profits Profits
Top
Top Share- Top
Corp. holder Total Normal Top Total
Year Tax Tax Tax Tax Surtax Tax
1921 12.5% 65% 77.50%i 8% 65% 73.00%
1922 12.5% 50% 63.50% 8% 50% 58.00%
1923 12.5% 50%j 62.50% 8% 50% 58.00%
1924 12.5% 40% 52.50% 6% 40% 46.00%
1925 13% 20% 33.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1926 13.50% 20% 33.50% 5% 20% 25.00%
1927 13.50% 20% 33.50% 5% 20% 25.00%
1928 12% 20% 32.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1929 11% 20% 31.00% 4% 20% 24.00%
1930 12% 20% 32.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1931 12% 20% 32.00% 5% 20% 25.00%
1932 13.75% 55% 68.75% 8% 55% 63.00%
1933 13.75% 55% 68.75% 8% 55% 63.00%
1934 13.75% 59% 72.75% 4% 59% 63.00%
i Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
j Does not reflect the impact of a 25% retroactive rebate of tax allowed to individuals in
1924 for 1923.
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CHART 2*
TAX ON PROFITS DISTRIBUTED BY A FIRM
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* Source:  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913-1915 corporate
tax), § II(A)(1), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-1915 normal tax), § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-
1915 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765 (1916-
1917 corporate tax), § 1(a), 39 Stat. at 756 (1916-1917 normal tax), § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 757
(1916-1917 surtax/shareholder tax); War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302
(1917 corporate tax), § 1206(2), 40 Stat. at 334 (1917 tax on undistributed corporate profits),
§ 1, 40 Stat. at 301 (1917 normal tax), § 2, 40 Stat. at 301 (1917 surtax/shareholder tax);
Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1076 (1918-1920 corporate tax),
§ 210(a), 40 Stat. at 1062 (1918-1920 normal tax), § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64 (1918-1910
surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252 (1921-1923
corporate tax), § 210, 42 Stat. at 233 (1921-1923 normal tax), § 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37
(1921-1923 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282
(1924 corporate tax), § 210(a), 43 Stat. at 264 (1924 normal tax), § 1200, 43 Stat. at 353
(1924 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 230(a)(1), (2), 44 Stat. 9, 39
(1925-1927 corporate tax), § 210(a), 44. Stat. at 21 (1925-1927 normal tax), § 211(a), 44
Stat. at 22-23 (1925-1927 surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 13(a), 45
Stat. 791, 797 (1928-1931 corporate tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1928-1931 normal tax),
§ 12(a), 45 Stat. at 797 (1928-1931 surtax/shareholder tax); Joint Resolution Reducing Rates
of Income Tax for the Calendar Year 1929, ch. 2, 46 Stat. 47, 47 (1929 corporate tax and
normal tax); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 13(a), 47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932-1933 corporate
tax), § 11, 45 Stat. at 795 (1932-1933 normal tax), § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174-77 (1932-1933
surtax/shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 13(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686 (1934
corporate tax), § 11, 48 Stat. at 684 (1934 normal tax), § 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86 (1934
surtax/shareholder tax).
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TABLE 3*
Tax on Profits Derived by a Corporation
Distributed Corporate Undistributed Corporate
Profits Profits
Top
Top Share- Top
Corp. holder Total Corp. Other Total
Year Tax Tax Tax Tax Tax Tax
1913 1% 6% 7.00% 1% 1.00%
1914 1% 6% 7.00% 1% 1.00%
1915 1% 6% 7.00% 1% 1.00%
1916 2% 13% 15.00% 2% 2.00%
1917 6%a 63%b 69.00%c 6%d 10%e 16.00%
1918 12% 65% 77.00%f 12% 12.00%
1919 10% 65% 75.00%g 10% 10.00%
1920 10% 65% 75.00%h 10% 10.00%
1921 12.5% 65% 77.50%i 12.50% 12.50%
1922 12.5% 50% 62.50% 12.50% 12.50%
* Source:  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913-1915 corporate
tax), § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-1915 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
§ 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765 (1916-1917 corporate tax), § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 757 (1916-1917
shareholder tax); War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917 corporate
tax), § 1206(2), 40 Stat. at 334 (1917 tax on undistributed corporate profits), § 2, 40 Stat. at
301 (1917 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1076
(1918-1920 corporate tax), § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64 (1918-1920 shareholder tax);
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252 (1921-1923 corporate tax),
§ 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37 (1921-1923 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234,
§ 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282 (1924 corporate tax), § 1200, 43 Stat. at 353 (1924 shareholder tax);
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 230(a)(1)-(2), 44 Stat. 9, 39 (1925-1927 corporate tax),
§ 210(a), 44. Stat. at 21 (1925-1927 normal tax), § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 22-23 (1925-1927
shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 13(a), 45 Stat. 791, 797 (1928-1931
corporate tax), § 12(a), 45 Stat. at 796 (1928-1931 shareholder tax); Joint Resolution
Reducing Rates of Income Tax for the Calendar Year 1929, ch. 2, 46. Stat. 47, 47 (1929
corporate tax); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 13(a), 47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932-1933
corporate tax), § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174-77 (1932-1933 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of
1934, ch. 277, § 13(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686 (1934 corporate tax), § 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86
(1934 shareholder tax).
Notes for Table 3:
a Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
b Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
c Does not reflect the impact of the war-excess profits tax, which was imposed on all
taxpayers.
d Reflects both the Income Tax, as amended in 1916, and the War Income Tax of 1917.
e Temporary tax on undistributed corporate profits.
f Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
g Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
h Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
i Does not reflect the impact of the war excess profits tax, which was imposed on
corporations only.
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Tax on Profits Derived by a Corporation
Distributed Corporate Undistributed Corporate
Profits Profits
Top
Top Share- Top
Corp. holder Total Corp. Other Total
Year Tax Tax Tax Tax Tax Tax
1923 12.5% 50%j 62.50% 12.50% 12.50%
1924 12.5% 40% 52.50% 12.50% 12.50%
1925 13% 20% 33.00% 13.00% 13.00%
1926 13.50% 20% 33.50% 13.50% 13.50%
1927 13.50% 20% 33.50% 13.50% 13.50%
1928 12% 20% 32.00% 12% 12.00%
1929 11% 20% 31.00% 11% 11.00%
1930 12% 20% 32.00% 12% 12.00%
1931 12% 20% 32.00% 12% 12.00%
1932 13.75% 55% 68.75% 13.75% 13.75%
1933 13.75% 55% 68.75% 13.75% 13.75%
1934 13.75% 59% 72.75% 13.75% 13.75%
j Does not reflect the impact of a 25% retroactive rebate of tax allowed to individuals in
1924 for 1923.
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TAX ON PROFITS DERIVED BY A CORPORATION
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* Source:  Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(G)(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913-1915 corporate
tax), § II(A)(2), 38 Stat. at 166 (1913-1915 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463,
§ 10, 39 Stat. 756, 765 (1916-1917 corporate tax), § 1(b), 39 Stat. at 757 (1916-1917
shareholder tax); War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, § 4, 40 Stat. 300, 302 (1917 corporate
tax), § 1206(2), 40 Stat. at 334 (1917 tax on undistributed corporate profits), § 2, 40 Stat. at
301 (1917 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 230(a)(1), 40 Stat. 1057, 1076
(1918-1920 corporate tax), § 211(a), 40 Stat. at 1062-64 (1918-1920 shareholder tax);
Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 230, 42 Stat. 227, 252 (1921-1923 corporate tax),
§ 211(a)(2), 42 Stat. at 235-37 (1921-1923 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234,
§ 230, 43 Stat. 253, 282 (1924 corporate tax), § 1200, 43 Stat. at 353 (1924 shareholder tax);
Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 230(a)(1)-(2), 44 Stat. 9, 39 (1925-1927 corporate tax),
§ 210(a), 44. Stat. at 21 (1925-1927 normal tax), § 211(a), 44 Stat. at 22-23 (1925-1927
shareholder tax); Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 13(a), 45 Stat. 791, 797 (1928-1931
corporate tax), § 12(a), 45 Stat. at 796 (1928-1931 shareholder tax); Joint Resolution
Reducing Rates of Income Tax for the Calendar Year 1929, ch. 2, 46. Stat. 47, 47 (1929
corporate tax); Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 13(a), 47 Stat. 169, 177 (1932-1933
corporate tax), § 12(a), 47 Stat. at 174-77 (1932-1933 shareholder tax); Revenue Act of
1934, ch. 277, § 13(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686 (1934 corporate tax), § 12(b), 48 Stat. at 684-86
(1934 shareholder tax).
